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ABSTRACT
An optimal linear world income tax that maximizes a border-neutral social welfare function
provides a drastic reduction in world consumption inequality, dropping the Gini coefficient from 0.69
to 0.25. In contrast, an optimal decentralized (i.e., within countries) redistribution has a miniscule
effect on world income inequality. Thus, the traditional public finance concern about the excess
burden of redistribution cannot explain why there is so little world redistribution.
Actual foreign aid is vastly lower than the transfers under the simulated world income tax,
suggesting that countries such as the United States either place a much lower value on the welfare of
foreigners or else expect that a very significant fraction of cross-border transfers is wasted. The
product of the welfare weight and one minus the share of transfers that are wasted constitutes an
implied weight that the United States assigns to foreigners.  We calculate that value to be as low as
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either that essentially all transfers are wasted or places essentially no value on the welfare of the
citizens of the poorest countries.
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In May, 2002 rock star Bono and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill 
toured Africa together.  At each stop they publicly aired their different views on the need 
and effectiveness of foreign aid.  Bono insisted that more aid is needed to lift Africa out 
of desperate poverty, implying that that it is largely the mendacity of developed countries 
that prevents more aid.  Secretary O’Neill argued that much aid has done little to reduce 
poverty, owing in large part to waste and corruption.   
This high-profile tour generated wide media coverage of global poverty and 
global income inequality.  But the same debate has been ongoing for many years. Gross 
disparities of income across countries
1 have drawn attention to the small amount  of 
resources transferred from the rich countries of the world to the poor countries, and have 
given rise to calls that the  rich countries devote much more of their resources to foreign 
aid.  For example, Sachs (2001) has called for the United States to double its aid budget 
and devote the funds to disease control, primary education, clean water, and other vital 
needs of impoverished places.  
The unwillingness of the United States and other developed countries to 
substantially raise their foreign aid may reflect one or both of two factors: the citizens of 
rich countries place a very low value on the welfare of the citizens of poor countries, or 
they may shy away from transfers because of the large efficiency cost that would plague 
such efforts.  This cost may have two sources.  One is the concern expressed by Secretary 
O’Neill and others that the funds would be not reach the targeted groups due to waste and  
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corruption.  Another type of cost relates to the traditional concern of public finance 
economists that the process of taxing the well off and transferring the proceeds to the less 
well off causes disincentives.  The economic cost of these disincentives limits the optimal 
amount of cross-country transfers that would be undertaken even by a policymaker with 
egalitarian impulses to redistribute from the globally rich to the globally poor. 
From this public finance perspective, it is clear that the problem of global 
redistribution has the same structure as the problem each country faces—trading off the 
efficiency costs of a progressive tax system against the more equal distribution of welfare 
it achieves. In fact, most countries achieve some degree of redistribution through their 
own tax-and-transfer system. Clearly, the extent of overall, world, redistribution is small 
relative to world inequality because cross-country transfers are minimal. The question of 
whether these minimal transfers are at least approximately optimal and what the optimal 
transfers would be requires further investigation, however. 
In this paper we explore this question quantitatively as follows. We first calculate 
each country’s optimal redistributive policy, assuming that each country sets its tax 
system to maximize a concave social welfare function of individual utility levels, 
knowing that the tax system will influence individuals’ choices.  Then each country will 
set its own tax schedule that is more or less progressive based on the distribution of 
incomes (more precisely, the ability to earn income) within that country.   Even though 
the social welfare function is concave, the desire to redistribute is constrained by the 
economic cost of the marginal tax rates the redistribution requires.  Using data on income 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
1 Milanovic (2002) has shown that the major source of world income inequality is cross-country 
differences.  
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inequality and assumptions about utility functions that imply how responsive behavior is 
to taxation, we calculate the optimal income tax system in each of 118 countries and 
characterize the amount of redistribution that these decentralized systems produce. 
Now we consider the hypothetical case of a world income tax, where the same tax 
schedule applies to everyone regardless of where they live, and which therefore allows 
for transfers across countries.  We first consider the case where there is no waste (other 
than excess burden) from cross-country transfers and that the tax setter is border-neutral, 
meaning that each person’s welfare enters the social welfare function the same regardless 
of where he or she lives.  Assuming further that the world decision maker has the same 
preferences as each country about the tradeoff between the mean and distribution of 
incomes (i.e., an equally concave social welfare function), and faces the same costs from 
imposing redistribution, we can solve for the optimal progressivity of the world income 
tax.  The solution depends on the inequality of world incomes, and not on the degree of 
inequality within countries.  
The results of simulating these stylized models reveal that the decentralized tax-
and-transfer scheme makes hardly any dent in the world income inequality. This is so 
even though countries pick progressive tax systems on their own. In contrast, an optimal 
world income tax would significantly reduce the world inequality of consumption, albeit 
with a larger efficiency cost and at the cost of a reduction in welfare of citizens of the 
richest 25 countries. Thus, we conclude that a concern about the excess burden of cross-
country transfers cannot explain why foreign aid is so low--what limits these transfers is 
not the efficiency cost of the redistribution.    
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What might?  One possibility is that weights put on the welfare of foreigners are 
lower than those put on the welfare of citizens, as implied by Bono. Another is that 
transfers are not used efficiently, as implied by Secretary O’Neill. In the final section we 
address these possibilities by allowing the policy makers in the rich countries to place a 
lower value on the welfare of the citizens of other countries at any given level of income 
compared to their own citizens, and/or expect that a fraction of cross-country transfers 
would be wasted. With our parameter assumptions we cannot distinguish between the 
Bono and O’Neill scenarios, but we can calculate precisely how low the product of that 
relative value and the share of transfers that are wasted must be in order to generate the 
current level of cross-country transfers, in the form of foreign aid, given by rich to poor 
countries. 
 It is shockingly low. In our baseline case, foreigners are on average valued by the 
U.S. at just 16% of an average American, with the citizens of the poorest countries 
weighted by as little as 1/20
th of one percent. The latter value implies either that U.S. puts 
essentially no weight on the welfare of those individuals or that 1/2000
th of the transfer is 
wasted or a combination of both.  
2 Methodology 
2.1  Calculating the Optimal Linear Income Tax 
Our central analytical tool is a model of the optimal income tax structure, as 
pioneered by Mirrlees (1971). The idea is that the government chooses an income tax 
function that maximizes a given social welfare function, subject to an exogenously 
specified revenue requirement and the constraint that individuals will choose the levels of  
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consumption and leisure that maximize their utility subject to their own budget 
constraints, which depend on the tax system chosen.  
There are three key elements of the problem. The first is the degree of concavity 
of the social welfare function, which captures how society makes the tradeoff between 
the sum of utilities and the distribution of utilities. Second is the elasticity of substitution 
between leisure and consumption in individuals' utility functions (which are assumed to 
be identical); this determines the amount of distortion, or welfare cost, for any given tax 
structure. The final element is the distribution of abilities, where an individual's ability is 
presumed to be equal to the pre-tax wage rate. Loosely speaking, the optimal income tax 
structure trades off the social welfare gains of a more equal distribution of utilities against 
the efficiency cost caused by the structure of marginal tax rates needed to achieve any 
given amount of redistribution. 
Although the optimal income tax literature has explored the sensitivity of the 
results to various assumptions about the social welfare function, the distribution of 
abilities, and the magnitude of behavioral response, it has not been used to quantitatively 
explore the implications of a decentralized system of redistribution in a world of gross 
inequalities across countries. This is the task we begin below. 
2.2  Choosing the Model Parameters  
There are two scenarios that we wish to compare. One is a decentralized solution, 
in which each country selects its own optimal linear income tax system. The other one is 
a world income tax system, in which the decision maker designs a single linear income 
tax that applies to all individuals in the world. This exercise requires making a host of 
assumptions about the distribution of earning potential, the utility function, welfare  
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function, behavioral elasticities and stylized economies we study. In what follows we 
review the main issues.  
2.2.1  The Distribution of Abilities 
The dispersion of abilities is critical because, in general and ceteris paribus, the 
optimal linear income tax will be more progressive (i.e., feature a higher demogrant and 
higher tax rate) the more unequal is the initial distribution of earning potential within the 
jurisdiction. Mirrlees (1971) presents an example in which widening the distribution of 
skills, assumed equal to wage rates, increased the optimal marginal tax rates; he 
concludes that the dispersion of skills necessary to imply marginal tax rates much higher 
than the 20 to 40 percent range is unrealistically high. In his baseline numerical 
simulation, he sets the value of the standard deviation of the associated normal 
distribution (denoted σ ) in the assumed logarithmic distribution of skills to be equal to 
0.39, derived from Lydall's (1968) figures for the distribution of income from 
employment in various countries. When Mirrlees repeated the simulation with σ =1.0, a 
much wider dispersion of ability, he reported that the optimal tax schedule 
“is in almost all respects very different. Tax rates are very high: a large 
proportion of the population is allowed to abstain from productive labour. 
The results seem to say that, in an economy with more intrinsic inequality 
in economic skill, the income tax is a more important weapon of public 
control than it is in an economy where the dispersion of innate skills is 
less. The reason is, presumably, that the labour-discouraging effects of the 




Stern (1976), examining only flat-rate tax systems, corroborates Mirrlees finding. 
For his base case featuring an elasticity of substitution between goods and leisure of 0.4, 
when σ =0.39, the optimal marginal tax rate is 0.225, but it rises to 0.623 when σ =1. 
Cooter and Helpman (1974) perform a variety of numerical simulations, and find that for 
all of them the optimal marginal tax rate increased as the constant-mean ability 
distribution spreads out.
2  
Of course, innate ability is unobservable, so its dispersion is not knowable, either. 
What is available, and are collected in Deininger and Squire (1996), are estimates of Gini 
coefficients for 138 countries. These estimates were produced from a variety of micro 
data sources, and come from studies of varying quality. They identify Gini coefficients 
based on actual observation of individual units drawn from household surveys, based on 
comprehensive coverage of the population, and based on comprehensive coverage of 
different income sources as well as of population groups. World Bank (2000, Table 2.8) 
is a more recent source of Gini coefficients. These estimates are based on survey data 
obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments, and 
in many cases overlap with the Deininger and Squire (1996) observations. In our 
simulations, we use the World Bank (2000) estimates as the primary source, and resort to 
the "high-quality" observations in Deininger and Squire (1996) for countries that are not 
present in that dataset. 
                                                                          
2 Helpman and Sadka (1978) claim that this result is not general, but offer only a trivial counter-
example that features a Rawlsian (maximin) social welfare function and a fixed lowest ability level of zero. 
They argue that there should exist counter-examples with more general social welfare functions, but admit 
they were unable to identify any such example.  
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A more vexing problem is that the studies sometimes calculate the inequality of 
pre-tax income, sometimes calculate the inequality of after-tax income, and sometimes 
calculate the inequality of consumption. Of course, none calculates the inequality of 
ability. By making strong assumptions about the process that generates income, one could 
claim to have recovered the distribution of abilities that is consistent with the data. For 
example, for a given and common utility function and tax system, one could convert the 
distribution of labor earnings into the distribution of abilities. This is the procedure we 
follow. 
Because of the greater variability of annual income compared to annual 
consumption, measures of inequality based on the former will tend to be higher. 
Deininger and Squire report that in their sample the mean difference between the 
expenditure-based Gini coefficients and those based on gross income is 6.6. They also 
report that for the nineteen pairs of Gini coefficients computed using the Luxembourg 
Income study data, those based on after-tax income were on average 3 points lower than 
those based on gross income; this sample includes, however, only one developing country 
(Mexico). Clearly, the quantitative importance of this effect will depend on the effective 
progressivity of the tax system in place. 
In what follows we assume that the distribution of abilities in each country is 
lognormal. Then, we parameterize the distribution so that the resulting Gini coefficient of 
income or consumption for a given country under a certain baseline income tax system
3 is 
equal to the empirical value. In this exercise, gross income is assumed to equal labor 
                                                                          
3 The baseline income tax system features a marginal tax rate of 0.30.  
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income of the individual, and both consumption and net income are assumed to 
correspond to after-tax income. 
2.2.2  The Individual Utility Function 
The individual utility function is a critical element of the problem because it 
determines the substitutability between leisure and consumption, which in turn reveals 
the marginal efficiency cost of any degree of tax progressivity. In his simulation analyses 
of the optimal linear income tax, Stern (1976) focuses on a constant-elasticity-of-
substitution (henceforth CES) utility function with an elasticity of substitution of 0.4, 
based on his reading of the labor supply elasticity literature available at that time. 
Depending on how it is read, the literature since then suggests considering both a lower 
and a higher number: lower because the aggregate elasticity of substitution between 
leisure and consumption may be less than 0.4,
4 higher because labor supply is only one 
dimension of behavioral response to taxation that involves an efficiency cost, and 
research on the elasticity of taxable income suggests that an elasticity of 0.6 may be 
appropriate (Auten and Carroll 1999; Gruber and Saez 2000; Slemrod, 1998). Although 
in this case the relevant behavioral response is summarized by an elasticity of taxable 
income rather than an elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, in order 
to be comparable with most of the optimal income tax literature we retain the standard 
modeling. However, we assign higher behavioral responses than have been found for 
labor supply, in order to represent the whole range of possible responses. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the "income elasticity" of optimal progressivity – do 
richer countries choose more progressive tax systems? – in this class of models has been  
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almost completely ignored. Indeed, the answer is not obvious. A proportional increase in 
all individuals’ abilities changes the set of tax systems that raise the required amount of 
revenue. Under certain conditions, the admissible tax systems are simply scaled up in the 
sense that an equi-proportionate change in all abilities, revenue, and the demogrant, 
holding the marginal tax rate constant, is still admissible (but perhaps no longer is 
optimal). However, holding taxes and the degree of inequality constant, the commonly 
used CES utility functions with an elasticity of substitution below unity imply that in 
countries with high average ability levels there is much less labor supply, relative to 
countries with low average abilities, than is apparently observed. As a result, the tax base 
and revenue collected increase less than proportionally, so that it is not possible to sustain 
a scaled up tax system. 
One approach to these issues is to consider the class of utility functions that yield 
the “scale” elasticity of zero.
5 As discussed by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1982), this 
class has the form U(ln(C)+g(L)), where C is consumption and L is leisure. The 
motivation for examining this utility function is to ensure that simulations yield results 
that are not grossly inconsistent with the empirical observation that labor supply is 
broadly similar across countries with widely varying average income levels. Note, 
though, that the optimal tax system may not simply scale up, because the optimum also 
depends on the social welfare function. What the assumption about utility functions 
guarantees is that, ceteris paribus, the income elasticity of the optimal tax structure 
depends only on the social welfare function.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
4 For a survey of the labor supply literature see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999).  
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In what follows, we present results for the Cobb-Douglas utility function. This is 
the only CES utility function that is also in the King-Plosser-Rebelo class. This choice 
implies a compensated elasticity of labor supply of one, which is high in the context of 
the literature on the elasticity of taxable income, but within the range of available 
estimates. 
2.2.3  The Social Welfare Function 
Although there have been attempts to recover a society's social welfare function 
(henceforth SWF) from examining actual government policies, or by examining 
individual risk aversion, for the most part economists have not tried to defend a particular 
SWF. Instead, they have investigated the implications of alternative specifications of the 
SWF for the solution to the problem at hand. We adopt that strategy as well. 
To be consistent with the earlier literature, we investigate SWFs of the type 
introduced by Atkinson (1970), that are of the form W = Σ (1-v)
-1U
1-v. The higher the 
value of v, the larger is the concavity of the SWF, and the larger is the implied 
willingness of the society to trade off the sum of utilities for a more equal distribution of 
the utilities. We investigate the implications of three values of v: 0.5, 2.0, and 5.0, but 
concentrate on the case of v=2.0, which is Stern's (1976) central case, as well. Whatever 
value we choose, we assume it is the same for all countries and for the designer of the 
world income tax. In so doing, we skirt the fascinating but difficult question of whether 
the degree of egalitarianism differs across countries, including whether it differs 
systematically depending on the mean level of income or on the distribution of abilities.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
5 Write leisure as L(sw,sG) i.e., a function of wage rate and income, where s is a scalar. The 
necessary property for a zero scale elasticity is dL/ds = 0. Note that this property depends on a combination 
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2.3  Introducing Tradables and PPP Differences 
In practice, there are significant differences in countries’ real price levels. 
Ignoring these differences would have some peculiar implications when we allow for 
transfers across countries. The centralized budget constraint would simply add up 
nominal taxes and subsidies of different economies, so that it would amount to assuming 
that U.S. and Indian consumption can be exchanged one for one. While this may be 
correct for tradable commodities, it is not correct for the non-tradable ones. There are 
also implications for the location of production. Ignoring the presence of non-tradable 
commodities and holding price levels fixed while allowing for large international 
transfers will invariably lead to poor countries shutting down their production and relying 
solely on transfers. The prediction of 100% voluntary unemployment across the Third 
World would be a highly undesirable model feature. 
In this section we enrich the model so as to address these issues in a more 
satisfactory way. The model features two sectors in each country that produce tradable 
and non-tradable commodities, denoted T and N, respectively. We normalize the (world) 
price of tradable goods to one. Non-tradable commodities are produced and consumed 
domestically. Because people want to consume both types of goods, some non-tradable 
goods have to be produced in each country. Equilibrium is reached by the adjustment of 
relative wages in the two sectors.
6 The details of the model follow. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
of income and price responses. 
6 An alternative equilibrating mechanism would allow the substitution of labor for capital. We do 
not, however, consider this to be a realistic possibility. For example, we are not aware of a conceivable way 
of substituting capital for the time of a barber. This example captures an important feature of at least some 
non-tradable commodities: they require the time of an individual. In other words, highly-skilled individuals 
are not more productive (or at least they are not much more productive) than the low-skilled ones.  
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2.3.1 Individuals 
Assume that there is a continuum of individuals characterized by (heterogeneous) 
skill levels a. We consider the following utility function 
() ( ) ()
1
1 ,, 1
r r r uTNL TN L
δδ αα
− − −−  =− +  
. This utility function is CES between leisure and 
consumption commodities. The Cobb-Douglas consumption segment implies that the 
fraction δ  of total income is spent on tradables, while the rest is spent on non-tradables. 
Denoting the price of non-tradables in country i as pi, consumption of the two types of 
goods is therefore given by 
  () ( ) ( ) () () ( ) ( ) ()
1
11 , 11 ,
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= + −− = + −− 
where  () wa is the wage rate of an individual with the skill level of a.  
2.3.2 Production 
We assume that production in both sectors takes place using only labor. However, 
the relative productivity of workers with different skill levels varies by sector. Each 
individual works in just one sector. More specifically, we assume that production in the 
tradable sector takes place using efficiency units of labor, such that 




Ta L a d F a =− ∫ , 
where the integration takes place over the set of workers who choose to work in the 
tradable sector, ST. The productivity of a worker in the non-tradable sector is assumed to 
be more closely related to the amount of time that is invested in the activity, although it is 
positively correlated with skill. In particular, we assume that the productivity in the non-
tradable sector is a
d, where 01 d ≤<, so that  
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N aL a d F a =− ∫ , 
where SN is the set of workers that choose to work in the non-tradable sector. In the 
extreme case when  0 d = , each individual is equally productive in the non-tradable 
sector. In general, more skilled individuals are more productive in the non-tradable 
sector, but by a smaller (and decreasing) factor than in the tradable sector. There are no 
country-specific productivity differentials other than differences in the skill levels of 
individuals. 
2.3.3 Equilibrium 
We assume that both sectors are competitive. Because the tradable good is the 
numeraire, the individual who chooses to work in the tradable sector will receive a wage 
rate equal to a per unit of his time. The individual who chooses to work in the non-
tradable sector is paid pia















Because it is assumed that d<1, low-skilled workers will choose to work in the non-
tradable sector and high-skilled workers will choose to work in the tradable sector, 
although the cutoff level of skill will differ from country to country and depend on the tax 
system in place.  
2.3.4  Features of the equilibrium 
The price of the non-tradable commodity determines the potential wages of every 
individual in each of the two sectors, which determines the sector in which individual is 
working and allows us to solve for individual consumption and labor decisions. 
Therefore, the price of non-tradables in a given country is sufficient to determine the  
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aggregate demand and supply of non-tradables. In the equilibrium, the price adjusts to 
make them equal.
7 Total imports of tradables must be equal to the transfer to the country: 
 
DS T T transfer −= , 
because transfers can only take the form of tradables. 
One feature of equilibrium is that richer economies have a higher price of non-
tradable commodities, so that the overall price level in richer economies is higher. This is 
also a well-known property of actual relative price levels, remarked upon by Balassa 
(1964) and Samuelson (1964),
8 who suggest explanations that are in the same spirit as 
this model. 
2.4  Calibration Methodology and Baseline Results 
Table A-1 lists the key data all of the 118 countries we examine. The first column 
lists the population in 1999. Note that, although not all countries are considered in the 
simulations, the countries that are considered comprise about 93% of world population. 
Next, the table shows the mean per capita income, in PPP dollars, followed by the PPP 
deflator. The level of gross national product (GNP) per capita varies from a low of $414 
(for Sierra Leone) to $38,247 (for Luxembourg). The next two columns present the Gini 
coefficients taken from World Bank (2000) or Deininger and Squire (1996), and the year 
for which the coefficient was calculated. There is significant variation in these 
coefficients, ranging as low as 0.19 for the Slovak Republic and exceeding 0.60 for 
Brazil, the Central African Republic, Gabon, Malawi and Sierra Leone. Although recall 
                                                                          
7 The level of inequality may affect the price level because it affects the relative supply of low and 
high skilled labor. Note also that 100% unemployment will not occur, because in this case no non-tradable 
goods would be produced. 
8 See Rogoff (1996) for a recent survey.  
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that the Gini coefficients are not directly comparable, the wide range strongly suggests 
that inequality varies greatly across countries. 
We assume that the utility function is Cobb-Douglas (r=0). This leaves three 
world-wide parameters to be selected: δ , the share of tradables in consumption; d, the 
productivity parameter in the non-tradable sector; and α , the share of leisure. There are 
also two country-specific parameters: the extent of inequality and the average skill (a) 
level (the distribution of a is assumed to be log-normal). Finally, the calibration 
procedure requires that each country’s revenue constraint is satisfied under the baseline 
tax system, adding the third country-specific requirement and pinning down the 
demogrant under the baseline tax system. 
In calibrating the model, we seek to match actual data regarding economy-specific 
mean incomes, Gini coefficients, and PPP indices, plus an overall world-wide average 
labor supply of 0.25. We first assume a standardized tax system with t=0.3  in all 
countries. Then, given d, δ  and α , we adjust the distribution of skills in each country to 
exactly match the empirical mean income and relevant Gini coefficient. This requires 
solving for an equilibrium at each step, and yields the price of non-tradables and 
consumption of the two types of commodities. Having this information for all countries 
makes it possible to compute the PPP indices.
9  
The next step is to select the values of d, δ , and α  that generate average labor 
supply at the desired level and that minimize the sum of squared deviations of the 
                                                                          
9 We use the Eltetö-Köves-Szulc (EKS) method that was used to compute PPP in our data. See 
Hill (1997) for a discussion of purchasing power parity methods and the EKS formula (equation 50).  
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simulated PPP levels of 118 countries from their actual 1999 PPP price levels.
10 This 
procedure generates calibrated parameter values of δ =.79, d=.12, α =.63. These parameter 
values imply that almost 80% of income is spent on tradable commodities. Furthermore, 
the small value of d implies that the non-tradable sector has significant decreasing returns 
to scale in individual skills, so that it is quite close to relying on just the amount of time 
provided.
11  
Table 1 presents the results of the calibration exercise for a few selected countries, 
and in the top row the world average.
12 (Table A-2 in the appendix shows the results for 
all 118 countries in the simulation). The first column of Table 1 shows the average labor 
                                                                          
10 There are a few complications in implementing this method. Most importantly, it may not be 
possible to match the empirical Gini values even by choosing extreme values of the inequality of skills. To 
see this concern, consider the case when δ =0. In this situation, all individuals employed in the non-tradable 
sector have exactly the same wage rate and exactly the same income. Because a given fraction of income 
must be spent on the production of this sector, this requires a big enough fraction of population working in 
this sector. As the result, the combination of a relatively low value of δ  and a relatively low value of d (i.e., 
a high share of non-tradables) makes the lower end of the distribution equal and large, therefore limiting 
the overall level of inequality. It turns out that there is a region of values of these parameters where the 
actual Gini coefficients for the most unequal countries may not be matched. It also turned out that the best 
choice of these parameters (i.e., the one that minimizes the deviations from the actual PPP levels) is on the 
boundary of this region (i.e., the country with the highest inequality level has an extreme inequality of 
skills). The parameters we use are almost on this boundary, but the results are not sensitive to shifting away 
from the boundary. 
11 With d=0, a
d=1, implying that skill would not matter at all in the non-tradable sector. As a 
result, only hours worked in that sector would determine its output. 
Table 1: Summary statistics about the baseline calibrated world economy, selected countries. 
Consumption Percentiles     Mean full 
time income 










ion Gini  
5% 50%  95% 
World   15,849  0.25   5,060  0% 0.72  0.68  609  1,814  27,860
United  States    95,093  0.27  30,636  0% 0.41  0.29 17,692 21,206 70,711
Israel    55,230  0.27  17,458  0% 0.36  0.25 10,817 13,372 36,518
Poland    12,639  0.28    3,963  0% 0.33  0.23 2,538 3,157 7,896
Peru    7,278  0.26    2,391  0% 0.46  0.32 1,298 1,508 5,982
El Salvador   5,635  0.25   1,898  0% 0.52  0.36  960  1,142  5,077
Papua New Guinea   2,084  0.20  801  0% 0.73  0.51  304  410  2,143
India    1,319  0.25  449  0% 0.54  0.38 221 266  1,230
Kyrgyz  Republic    934  0.27  300  0% 0.41  0.28 175 210 680
Ethiopia    289  0.24  100  0% 0.57 0.40 47 58  285 
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income if everybody worked full-time (i.e., consumed no leisure at all). The following 
columns show the average labor supply, consumption, and unemployment rate. 
Unemployment in this model is voluntary, and is a result of the demogrant that implies 
that a certain degree of consumption is possible even with zero labor supply. Although 
the simulated unemployment rate is as high as 21% for a few of the most unequal 
economies (those with Gini coefficients exceeding 0.55; see Table A-2 in the appendix), 
in aggregate only a tiny fraction (less than 0.5%) of the world’s population chooses not to 
work. Those that choose to be unemployed are at the bottom of the ability distribution in 
a given country. Because with a Cobb-Douglas utility function, richer economies are just 
scaled-up versions of poorer ones, the unemployment rate is simply a function of the 
degree of inequality in underlying abilities.  
The next two columns show the Gini coefficients of pre-tax labor income and 
consumption in the baseline simulation. Note that, because of the redistributive nature of 
the baseline tax system, the former is always higher than the latter, with the difference 
between the two measures ranging between 5 and 25 points. In each case, the parameters 
have been selected so that the relevant one of these is equal to the empirical value from 
Table A-1. The Gini coefficient of consumption for the world as a whole is 0.68, while 
the Gini coefficient based on labor income is 0.72.  




percentiles of the distribution. Huge inequality of consumption is evident in the statistics 
for the world: median consumption is $1,814, while consumption at the 95
th percentile is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
12 The world average is computed over all individuals, and is not equal to the unweighted average 
of the country averages.  
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$27,860. As Figures A-2 and A-3 show, the calibrated PPP indices quite closely match 
the actual ones, although this mostly reflects the fact that the dependence of the price 
level on income is well accounted for. In reality there is also significant variation in the 
price level conditional on income level, and this is not well explained by our model. 
There is a small variation of the price level conditional on income that is produced by our 
model (due to differences in inequality levels), but it is nowhere near what is observed in 
the data.  
3 Results 
We are now ready to calculate the optimal income tax systems, first for each 
country and then for the world income tax. Table 2 shows the results for a subset of 
countries; Table A-3 in the appendix gives the full set of results.  
In the focal simulation we assume that the parameter of the Atkinson's welfare 
function is v=2.0.
13 The first and third columns of Table 2 show the parameters – 
marginal tax rate and demogrant – of the decentralized optimal linear income tax. The 
optimal marginal tax rates are monotonically related to the Gini coefficients shown in 
Table 1. Under the decentralized solution, the optimal marginal tax rate varies between 
0.13 for the Slovak Republic and 0.82 for Gabon. The population-weighted-average 
marginal tax rate is 0.41. 
                                                                          
13 As we discuss later, the qualitative conclusions are robust to changes in this parameter.  
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The second and fourth columns of Table 2 show the parameters of the optimal 
world income tax. The marginal tax rate is 0.62, substantially higher than the average 
under the decentralized solution, although smaller than the decentralized tax rates for a 
handful of the most unequal economies. The world income tax system also features a 
very significant demogrant of $3,112. This demogrant exceeds the actual per capita GNP 
for 73 countries. Note, however, that the aid from abroad backfires as well, because it 
takes the form of tradable commodities. As a result, the larger the aid, the lower the value 
of tradables in terms of non-tradables and the less effective is a dollar of transfers. 
Because of the monotonic relationship between the Gini and optimal 
progressivity, the world income tax rate is higher than the rate for almost all countries in 
the world. For this reason, the deadweight loss is significantly higher than would occur 
under the decentralized systems. The ratio of deadweight loss to the amount of 
redistribution achieved is also higher than it need be under a decentralized redistribution 
scheme. To see why, consider the hypothetical situation where each country has the same 
Gini but differing levels of mean income, so that each country would on its own choose 
the same optimal marginal tax. Assume further that the marginal tax rate that the world 
Table 2: Comparison of the decentralized solution and the WIT 
 
















  Dec. WIT  Dec.  WIT  Dec. WIT Dec. WIT Dec. WIT  Dec.  WIT  Dec.  WIT  Dec. WIT WIT 
World  0.41  0.62   1,539  3,112  0.75 0.79 0.69 0.25 0.21  0.09  5,027  5,016  5,027 5,016 2% 15% 0.0 
     
United States  0.36 0.62 10,373  3,112 0.43 0.44 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.29 29,058 15,072 29,058 31,504 0%  0%-16,432.0 
Israel  0.30 0.62   5,267  3,112  0.36 0.41 0.25 0.27 0.27  0.25 17,417  9,293 17,417 16,283 0%  0% -6,989.7 
Poland  0.28 0.62   1,127  3,112  0.32 0.45 0.23 0.08 0.28  0.08  4,041  3,737  4,041 1,646 0%  0% 2,090.2 
Peru  0.40 0.62   876  3,112  0.50 0.53 0.30 0.07 0.22  0.06  2,179  3,557  2,179 1,172 0%  9% 2,384.3 
El Salvador  0.45 0.62   751  3,112  0.57 0.57 0.31 0.07 0.19  0.05  1,660  3,522  1,660 1,081 0% 15% 2,441.2 
Papua New Guinea  0.63 0.62   416  3,112  0.82 0.72 0.31 0.08 0.08  0.04  665  3,478  665 966 19% 40% 2,512.3 
India  0.47 0.62   182  3,112  0.60 0.53 0.32 0.04 0.18  0.04  388  3,384  388 718 0% 23% 2,666.2 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.35 0.62   101  3,112  0.42 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.25  0.04  286  3,381  286 710 0% 10% 2,671.0 
Ethiopia  0.50 0.62   42  3,112  0.64 0.56 0.32 0.05 0.16  0.04  85  3,381  85 710 0% 27% 2,670.8 
a Gini coefficients for the world are calculated using labor/consumption adjusted for purchasing 
power parity differences.  
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planner would choose is the same, because (we assume) world inequality is 
approximately the same as in each country. Because each person faces the same marginal 
tax rate under the decentralized and world income tax systems, the deadweight loss in the 
two cases would also be identical. However, the world income tax system would 
accomplish much more redistribution, because it is not providing demogrants to people 
who are poor from a country's perspective but who are not poor from a world perspective.  
The middle four columns of Table 2 show the Gini coefficients of consumption 
and labor income under the decentralized and world income tax regimes. Not 
surprisingly, the Gini coefficients of consumption are lower than those of labor income.
14  
Redistributive tax systems render consumption considerably more equal.  
A striking result of this simulation is that the decentralized tax system does not 
substantially affect the degree of inequality for the whole world. The Gini coefficient of 
consumption decreases only slightly when compared to the original calibrated world 
featured in Table 1.
15 In fact, if tax rates in all countries were set to zero, the Gini 
coefficient of consumption would be 0.695, compared to just 0.689 under the 
decentralized tax systems. Each country redistributing on its own makes only a small dent 
in world inequality. This result simply reflects that inequality in the distribution of all 
individuals’ income, regardless of where in the world they live, is higher than the 
inequality of individuals’ income within nearly every country of the world. According to 
Milanovic (1999), the differences in countries’ mean income explain at least three-
                                                                          
14 In most cases the Gini coefficient of consumption falls below the baseline values of Table 1, for 
both the decentralized and the world tax systems, with exceptions to this rule being the economies that 
optimally set taxes below the baseline value of t=0.3.  
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quarters of overall world inequality. No country on its own can transfer income from the 
world’s rich to the world’s poor, because no country has the world’s poorest and the 
world’s richest among its citizens. Consequently, decentralized redistribution cannot 
significantly address world’s inequality.  
The world income tax fares significantly better in reducing the inequality of 
consumption. The Gini coefficient goes from 0.69 under the decentralized tax regimes to 
0.25 under the WIT, when calculated using consumption adjusted for the (endogenous) 
price level. However, because of its disincentive effects, the world income tax also 
decreases the average level of consumption and reduces average labor supply. Average 
labor supply (the number of hours worked) falls by more than half, from 0.21 to 0.09, 
under the world income tax. This decline is mostly due to the sharp decline in labor 
supply in the poor economies. The world unemployment rate increases from 2% to 15%.  
Although by construction there are no cross-border transfers under the 
decentralized solution, under the world income tax the implicit transfers are substantial. 
For example, per capita the United States transfers $16,432 abroad. Countries at about the 
mean income of Uruguay  and below receive net transfers, and the poorest countries 
receive more than $2,600 per capita. The mean level of welfare for the whole world
16 
increases under the world income tax system when compared to the decentralized 
solution, implying that the world income tax is more successful in redistributing income 
than the decentralized system. Under the decentralized solution, the average welfare level 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
15 This is possible because for many richer economies our baseline tax rate of 0.3 exceeds the 
optimal marginal tax rate, and therefore for these countries there is more redistribution in the baseline case 
than under the optimal income tax structure. 
16 The welfare levels are normalized for expositional purposes. Only relative differences are of 
interest.  
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in the world is about equal to that of the average Filipino. A conversion to the world 
income tax brings it to about the level of a typical Czech. Not surprisingly, there are huge 
welfare gains for residents of the poor countries and substantial welfare losses for 
residents of the developed economies.  
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of switching from decentralized income tax 
systems to a world income tax by plotting tax as a function of gross income for 
individuals at the 5th, 50th, and 95th percentiles (under the decentralized system) for 
three countries: India, Poland, and the United States. For the citizens of the United States, 
tax due under the world income tax exceeds tax liability under the decentralized tax 
system for any level of gross income. This is also true for the richest Poles, but most 
Poles would observe a decrease in tax liability, absent behavioral response. Even the 
richest Indians gain, although not as much as the poorest ones. The figure also shows that 
the marginal tax rate increases under the WIT for all three economies. As a result, within 
each country the richest citizens gain least (or lose most).  
The value of the substantial cross-country transfers (for example, citizens of India 
receive on average a nominal transfer of $2,666) may seem to be magnified by 
Table 3: Comparison of the decentralized solution and the WIT: Further details 
Consumption Percentiles 






5% 50%  95% 
Average welfare 
  Dec.  WIT Dec. WIT  Dec.  WIT  Dec. WIT Dec. WIT Dec. WIT  Dec.  WIT 
World  0.22 0.13 3,371 7,687    566 4,962 1,599 6,198 28,784 14,043  -7,564,213 -4,384,246 
           
United States  0.35 0.25 17,525 12,467 1.00 1.00 17,373 6,835 20,198 10,808 65,683 37,657  -2,698,305 -3,608,738 
Israel  0.34 0.21 10,858 9,250 0.85 0.90 10,812 5,260 13,346 7,353 36,416 19,906  -3,180,572 -3,932,527 
Poland  0.28 0.14 2,992 5,578  0.57  0.69 2,566 3,261 3,216 3,531 8,097 5,195 -4,961,715 -4,422,498 
Peru  0.25 0.13 1,869 5,883  0.50  0.70 1,272 3,112 1,465 3,431 5,207 4,252 -5,846,696 -4,458,642 
El  Salvador  0.22 0.12 1,587 6,105  0.48  0.71  955 3,112 1,120 3,399 4,082 3,945 -6,288,349 -4,474,412 
Papua New Guinea  0.12 0.10 1,198 7,525 0.44 0.82  416 3,112 480 3,233  1,251  4,256  -8,109,220 -4,549,222 
India  0.18 0.10 456 7,100  0.33  0.78 222 3,112 263 3,327 963  3,892  -9,720,412 -4,542,144 
Kyrgyz  Republic  0.20 0.10 299 7,191  0.29  0.79 172 3,112 201 3,362 635  3,734  -10,884,054 -4,549,296 
Ethiopia 0.14 0.08 127 8,589  0.22  0.91  49 3,112 58 3,311  212  3,934  -15,303,253 -4,609,515 
a Consumption percentiles for the world are calculated using consumption adjusted for purchasing 
parity differences.  
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differences in the cost of living in different economies. For example, under the 
decentralized solution the purchasing power of a dollar in India is magnified by a factor 
of more than three. However, transfers may take the form of tradables only, so that they 
are not as beneficial as a pure income transfer would be. This is reflected in significant 
changes in the cost of living of the poorest economies, which reflect the increased prices 
of non-tradables. This occurs because, as an economy becomes richer (due to transfers), 
the demand for non-tradables increases, but their supply is still bounded by the 
economy's own labor resources. In the case of India, the price of non-tradables under the 
WIT increases by a factor of twenty, and the overall cost of living increases from 0.33 to 
0.78 (Table 3). In fact, one result of this transfer scheme is that most of the poorest 
economies end up consuming less non-tradable goods. This is because there is an overall 
decrease in labor supply as the result of the large transfer. 
The differences in the cost of living also make it possible for average 
consumption in the world to stay almost constant in PPP terms. Looking at the percentiles 
of consumption, it is clear that under the world income tax most of the population gains. 
The consumption level of the world-median individual increases by $4,600 in PPP terms. 
At the same time, the structure of consumption changes. Consumption of non-tradables 
falls in every country. 
 
4  Foreign Aid and the Bono/O’Neill Factor 
A striking feature of the optimal world income tax solution is the large transfers 
from the rich countries, amounting in the United States to $16,432 per capita.  In fact, 
many relatively well-off countries do provide foreign aid to less well-off countries, and  
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most rich countries contribute to multilateral institutions such as the World Bank that 
offer assistance to relatively poor countries. How does it compare to our simulated level 
of optimal transfers, and what does the comparison imply? 
4.1 Foreign  Aid 
The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD publishes annual 
data on both bilateral and multilateral aid flows.
17 Its 1999 report indicates that in 1998 
the U.S. gave $5.988 billion of bilateral assistance, and $2.798 billion of multilateral 
assistance, for a total of $8.786 billion of official development assistance. This last figure 
represents 0.10% of U.S. GNP, and is $33 per capita. To put the U.S. figures in 
perspective, for all 21 DAC countries (including the U.S.), official development 
assistance represented 0.24% of GNP; the U.S. ranks 21st among the 21 countries 
represented. The actual amount of net aid contributed or received by various countries, 
from World Bank (2000, Tables 6.8 and 6.10), is presented in the last column of Table A-
1.
18 
                                                                          
17 There is a considerable literature on the determinants of foreign aid, in particular the extent to 
which it is motivated by strategic and political considerations as opposed to altruistic and humane ones. 
Lumsdaine (1997) investigates the effect of colonial links between donor and recipient, the democratic 
status of the recipients, and the income level of the recipient, but presents only simple correlations rather 
than a full-blown multivariate analysis. Alesina and Dollar (1998) do perform such an analysis (of bilateral 
aid flows only), and find considerable evidence that the direction of foreign aid is indeed dictated by 
political and strategic considerations much more than by either the economic needs or the policy 
performance of the recipient. 
A separate but relevant literature concerns the effects of foreign aid on the receiving countries, and 
has been studied by Jepma (1997) and Boone (1994, 1996). Most recently, Burnside and Dollar (2000) find 
that aid is beneficial to countries that adopt appropriate and stable policies, and is wasted otherwise. 
However, they find no evidence that foreign aid encourages the adoption of "good" macroeconomic 
policies. 
18 Table 6.8 of World Bank (2000) reveals the official development assistance and aid 
contributions of the high-income economies in 1998. It includes both bilateral transfers and contributions to 
the financial institutions. Table 6.10 shows the amount of assistance and aid received by various countries. 
These numbers do not balance out. This is because some aid is allocated by region, but not by country, and 
because of administrative costs, research into development issues, and aid to non-governmental 
  
  26
4.2  Bono and O’Neill: Estimating the Implicit Discounting of Foreigners' 
Well-being and/or the Implicit Extent of Waste 
The actual flows of aid are miniscule compared to what our simulated world 
income tax generates.  The discrepancy cannot be explained by the efficiency costs that 
would result from the higher marginal tax rates needed to generate the tax revenue to be 
transferred from the poor countries—that is an integral part of the WIT simulations. One 
natural explanation for the discrepancy is that, contrary to the model’s assumption, 
Americans are not border-neutral at all, but rather value the welfare of a foreigner 
significantly less than the welfare of an American.  Another is that transfers are not used 
efficiently, so that the richer countries perceive them as a waste of resources. 
The notion that Americans’ altruism stops, or nearly stops, at the border will not 
shock most readers. Neither will the possibility that transfers are wasted. With the model 
we have developed, though, we can go beyond suggesting these notions to quantify what 
the actual flows of aid imply about how much the United States weighs the well-being of 
a resident of, say, India. Our weights reflect a combination of a lower weight put on 
foreigners’ well-being and the extent of waste. Our preferred interpretation of them is as 
a measure of the extent to which transfers are wasted that must be implicitly subscribed 
to if the United States weights citizens of a given country as Americans and yet chooses 
not to provide substantial aid. 
To fix ideas, consider a simple version of this setup in which the U.S. and India 
are the only countries in the world, and each country has only a poor person (denoted P) 
and a rich person (denoted R). Each country makes its own decisions about its tax-and-
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
organizations. As the result, contributions exceed aid received by approximately $22 billion. The total 
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transfer system. The social welfare function of the U.S. includes the utility level of 
Indians, although the Indians' utilities may have a relative weight of less than one. The 
social welfare function of the U.S. has the form  ()
1 11 1 1 1-
vv v v
RS PS RI PI W   v U U +bU +bU
− − −−−   =+   , 
where Uij refers to the utility of the i
th person in the j
th country (S=US and I=India), and b 
(0<b) is the relative weight placed on an Indian's utility.  
The United States now has three policy instruments: the demogrant and income 
tax rate as before, plus a transfer to the Indian government. The U.S. knows the Indian 
social welfare function, so it knows exactly how India will adjust its own demogrant and 
tax rate upon receipt of a transfer, and can therefore calculate the increase in the utility of 
each Indian citizen. Given these assumptions, we can in the framework of our simulated 
model calculate the amount of transfer to India the U.S. will make for any value of b. 
Conversely, we can work backwards and calculate what value of b is consistent with the 
amount of transfers we observe. In what follows we do the latter. Before we do so, we 
introduce the possibility that transfers are wasted. Specifically, we assume that a transfer 
from the U.S. to any other country need not go toward reducing that country’s revenue 
requirement but instead it can be wasted by corrupt politicians, whose welfare we assign 
a zero weight. We denote the extent of this waste in country i by a
i, so that a transfer of T 
results in a decrease of the revenue requirement by (1-a
i)T.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
amount of aid received is about $35 billion.  
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Calculating the implied weights on the well-being of other countries’ residents is 
straightforward, as long as each country selects its tax system optimally. Denote by λ
i the 
marginal social welfare benefit from a marginal increase in public spending in country i. 
Formally, this is the Lagrange multiplier on the revenue constraint in the i
th country’s 
optimal tax problem.
19 Because of the possibility of waste, the marginal welfare from 
transfer of a dollar to country i is then (1-a
i)λ
i. On the margin, the optimizing government 
considering international aid compares its own λ  to that of other countries. At the 




j, for any recipient 
country j, where b
j is the welfare weight attached to country j. This formula allows us to 
calculate the product (1-a
j)b
j directly, because optimization yields the values of the λ ’s. 
In the case of the model of Section 2, we additionally adjust this formula for differences 





ij is the index of cost of living in country j 
relative to country i. 
                                                                          
19 At the optimum, it is equal to the average of marginal utilities of income (from the social 
welfare point of view) in a given country. 






World  0.1591 0.3795 
    
United States  1.0000 1.0000 
France  0.8188 0.9051 
Israel  0.5284 0.6618 
Poland  0.0802 0.2933 
Peru  0.0336 0.2771 
El Salvador  0.0233 0.2725 
Papua New Guinea  0.0071 0.2524 
India  0.0035 0.2609 
Kyrgyz Republic  0.0024 0.2636 
Ethiopia  0.0005 0.2557  
  29
Table 4 presents the implied marginal weights from the point of view of the U.S. 
for a selected group of countries. By construction, ceteris paribus, weights for the poorer 
economies must be smaller than those for the richer ones. For the poorest economy of 
Ethiopia, this weight is just 0.0005. One blunt interpretation is that the latter number 
implies that the amount of actual foreign aid given by the U.S. to Ethiopia is consistent 
with the well-being of an Ethiopia resident being valued at 1/2000 of that of an 
American. Alternatively, it can be believed that only 1/20
th of one percent of aid reaches 
its desired recipients. A combination of the two is also possible. For example, if as much 
as 5% of aid reaches its recipients, the corresponding welfare weight consistent with the 
observed amount of aid would still be equal to just 0.01. 
The column labeled WIT in Table 4 reveals that even under an optimal world 
income tax there is still room for a potential welfare improvement: the average weight for 
the rest of the world is 0.4, so that a marginal dollar in U.S. transfers would still finance a 
$2.50 increase in welfare, if used to finance a universal increase in the demogrant. This 
is, however, not feasible in our model because of the assumed linearity of the tax system 
that precludes a unilateral change of the U.S. transfers.
20 
5 Sensitivity  Analyses 
In Table 5, we present the results of simulations analogous to those of Section 3, 
but for different degrees of concavity of the common social welfare function. We 
consider v=0.5, 2.0 and 5.0. Because v=2.0 is our baseline case, the numbers in this part 
                                                                          
20 In a more general nonlinear tax system the feasibility of such transfers would be limited by the 
incentive constraints.  
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repeat information shown earlier. A value of v=5.0 corresponds to a much more 
egalitarian social welfare function, while v=0.5 is a much less egalitarian social welfare 
function. To save space, we show only the results for the world as a whole and three 
different countries: the United States, Poland and India. As expected, increasing 
egalitarianism leads to more redistribution: marginal tax rates increase under both the 
decentralized and world income tax solutions. Notably, though, the changes are much 
larger in the decentralized case. This is because world inequality is very extreme to begin 
with, and therefore even a low redistributive incentive induces high marginal tax rates 
(and the optimal marginal tax rate is bounded from above by the one corresponding to the 
“peak” of the Laffer curve). Indeed, the optimal world income tax is almost unaffected by 
changes in the concavity of the welfare function. 
Changes in the social welfare function also have significant consequences for the 
implied weights. This is intuitive. Without any redistributive incentive, these weights 
would all be equal to one even if the distribution of incomes were very unequal. 
Therefore, the lower is the concavity of the social welfare function, the higher should be 
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis  
Consumption Percentiles   Marginal 
tax 
Demogrant Transfer  PPP 
5% 50%  95% 
Marginal 
welfare 
  Dec.  WIT Dec. WIT WIT  Dec.  WIT  Dec. WIT Dec. WIT Dec. WIT Dec.  WIT 
v=0.5              
World 0.36  0.60  1,329  3,061  0.0  574 5,046  1,677  6,292 29,970 14,595  0.1982 0.4266
United States  0.30  0.60  9,244  3,061  -16,155.7  1.00 1.00 17,691 7,077 21,167 11,203 70,509 39,202  1.0000 1.0000
Poland 0.21  0.60  913  3,061  2,010.4  0.57 0.68 2,641 3,243  3,390  3,513 8,714 5,349  0.2018 0.3506
India 0.43  0.60  172  3,061  2,632.5  0.33 0.76 223 3,061  265  3,288 1,031 3,848  0.0235 0.3201
v=2.0              
World 0.41  0.62  1,539  3,112  0.0  566 4,962  1,599  6,198 28,784 14,043  0.1591 0.3795
United States  0.36  0.62  10,373  3,112  -16,432.0  1.00 1.00 17,373 6,835 20,198 10,808 65,683 37,657  1.0000 1.0000
Poland  0.28   0.62   1,127  3,112  2,090.2  0.57   0.69  2,566 3,261  3,216  3,531 8,097 5,195  0.0802 0.2933
India 0.47  0.62  182  3,112  2,666.2  0.33 0.78 222 3,112  263  3,327 963 3,892  0.0035 0.2609
v=5.0              
World 0.45  0.64  1,722  3,162  0.0  561 4,864  1,527  6,081 27,408 13,433  0.1385 0.3273
United States  0.41  0.64  11,252  3,162  -16,713.8  1.00 1.00 17,014 6,570 19,233 10,375 61,132 35,966  1.0000 1.0000
Poland  0.33   0.64   1,280  3,162  2,174.2  0.57   0.70  2,493 3,277  3,060  3,548 7,572 5,024  0.0129 0.2245
India 0.51  0.64  189  3,162  2,699.5  0.34 0.80 221 3,162  261  3,363 905 3,933  0.0001 0.1883 
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these weights. For example, when v=0.5, the implied welfare weight attached by the U.S. 
to an Indian is 0.32, and it falls to 0.19 for v=5.0. 
6  Summary and Ruminations  
The decentralization of redistribution decisions results in vastly less redistribution 
than would a centralized world income tax, even if the world policy maker considers the 
disincentive effects caused by the higher taxes needed for cross-country transfers. In our 
stylized simulation of redistribution policy, the decentralized system hardly budges the 
world Gini coefficient of consumption, even though it reduces it for particular countries. 
Put bluntly, within-country redistributive schemes are of almost no value from the world 
perspective. In contrast, a world income tax would provide a drastic reduction in 
consumption inequality, cutting the Gini coefficient by nearly two-thirds. The 
decentralized scheme is also relatively inefficient, as it causes an efficiency loss that is 
larger than it need be to achieve the same amount of redistribution as would a centralized 
system. To be sure, the world income tax features a much higher absolute efficiency cost, 
because it has a higher marginal tax rate than most countries would choose on their own. 
The actual flow of foreign aid is minuscule compared to what the optimal world 
income tax implies, suggesting that the social policies of the rich countries are not 
border-neutral, or anything close to that. In our baseline case, we calculate that this level 
of transfer is consistent with the U.S. on average valuing the well-being of foreigners 
only 1/6ths as much as an American citizen, and less than 1/2000th for poorest of the 
developing economies. Alternatively, it corresponds to an extreme extent of waste so that 
only 1/20
th of one percent of transfers reaches its desired recipients.  
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This conclusion is sensitive to the assumed concavity of the social welfare 
function. Furthermore, our interpretation of weights is subject to a number of caveats. 
The first is due to the restrictiveness of the instruments that we consider: a linear tax does 
not allow the targeting of aid directly to the poorest members of the poor economies. If 
more targeted ways of transferring aid were available, the implied weights consistent 
with actual transfers would be even lower. We consider only a static framework and do 
not account for the effect that transfers can have on human or physical capital 
accumulation and, therefore, on future growth. Finally, it would certainly be interesting to 
credibly distinguish ethnocentrism from perceived inefficiencies.  
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Bank. Table A-1: Data
Country Population GNP GNP (PPP) PPP deflator Gini Year of Gini Net aid
1 Luxembourg 432 44,640 38,247 1.167                 26.90            1994
g
-115
2 Switzerland 7,120 38,350 27,486 1.395                 33.10            1992
g
-974
3 Norway 4,454 32,880 26,522 1.240                 25.80            1995
g
-1373
4 Japan 126,570 32,230 24,041 1.341                 24.90            1993
g
-10772
5 Denmark 5,317 32,030 24,280 1.319                 24.70            1992
g
-1822
6 United States 272,878 30,600 30,600 1.000                 40.80            1997
g
-11512
7 Singapore 3,223 29,610 27,024 1.096                 39.00            1989
g,d
2
8 Austria 8,086 25,970 23,808 1.091                 23.10            1987
g
-647
9 Germany 82,027 25,350 22,404 1.131                 30.00            1994
g
-6235
10 Sweden 8,857 25,040 20,824 1.202                 25.00            1992
g
-1678
11 Belgium 10,223 24,510 24,200 1.013                 25.00            1992
g
-951
12 Netherlands 15,802 24,320 23,052 1.055                 32.60            1994
g
-3172
13 Finland 5,167 23,780 21,209 1.121                 25.60            1991
g
-478
14 Hong Kong 6,877 23,520 20,939 1.123                 45.00            1991
g,d
7
15 France 60,794 23,480 21,897 1.072                 32.70            1995
g
-6565
16 United Kingdom 59,110 22,640 20,883 1.084                 36.10            1991
g
-4299
17 Australia 18,994 20,050 22,448 0.893                 35.20            1994
g
-961
18 Italy 57,649 19,710 20,751 0.950                 27.30            1995
g
-2521
19 Canada 30,604 19,320 23,725 0.814                 31.50            1994
g
-1848
20 Ireland 3,727 19,160 19,180 0.999                 35.90            1987
g
-199
21 Israel 6,093 17,450 16,867 1.035                 35.50            1992
g
1066
22 Spain 39,410 14,000 16,730 0.837                 32.50            1990
g
-1381
23 New Zealand 3,823 13,780 16,566 0.832                 43.90            1993
g
-130
24 Greece 10,536 11,770 14,595 0.806                 32.70            1993
g
-179
25 Portugal 9,990 10,600 15,147 0.700                 35.60            1994-95
g
-279
26 Slovenia 1,981 9,890 15,062 0.657                 26.80            1995
g
40
27 Korea Republic 46,848 8,490 14,637 0.580                 31.60            1993
c
-50
28 Uruguay 3,312 5,900 8,280 0.713                 42.30            1989
g
24
29 Czech Republic 10,280 5,060 12,289 0.412                 25.40            1996
g
447
30 Chile 15,018 4,740 8,370 0.566                 56.50            1994
g
105
31 Hungary 10,068 4,650 10,479 0.444                 30.80            1996
g
209
32 Croatia 4,464 4,580 6,915 0.662                 26.80            1998
c
39
33 Brazil 168,066 4,420 6,317 0.700                 60.00            1996
g
329
34 Mexico 97,425 4,400 7,719 0.570                 53.70            1995
g
15
35 Trinidad and Tobago 1,293 4,390 7,262 0.605                 40.30            1992
g
14
36 Poland 38,695 3,960 7,894 0.502                 32.90            1996
g
902
37 Venezuela 23,707 3,670 5,268 0.697                 48.80            1996
g
37
38 Slovak Republic 5,396 3,590 9,811 0.366                 19.50            1992
g
155
39 Mauritius 1,170 3,590 8,652 0.415                 36.69            1991
c,d
40
40 Estonia 1,442 3,480 7,826 0.445                 35.40            1995
g
90
41 Malaysia 22,710 3,400 7,963 0.427                 48.50            1995
g
202
42 Gabon 1,208 3,350 5,325 0.629                 63.18            1977
c,d
45
43 Botswana 1,588 3,240 6,032 0.537                 54.21            1986
c,d
106
44 South Africa 21,429 3,160 8,318 0.380                 59.30            1993-94
c
512
45 Panama 2,808 3,070 5,016 0.612                 48.50            1997
c
22
46 Turkey 64,328 2,900 6,126 0.473                 41.50            1994
c
14
47 Costa Rica 3,588 2,740 5,770 0.475                 47.00            1996
g
27
48 Belarus 10,208 2,630 6,518 0.403                 21.70            1998
c
28
49 Lithuania 3,699 2,620 6,093 0.430                 32.40            1996
c
128
50 Latvia 2,430 2,470 5,938 0.416                 32.40            1998
g
97
51 Peru 25,230 2,390 4,387 0.545                 46.20            1996
g
501
52 Jamaica 2,598 2,330 3,276 0.711                 36.40            1996
c
18
53 Russian Federation 146,512 2,270 6,339 0.358                 48.70            1998
c
1017
54 Colombia 41,539 2,250 5,709 0.394                 57.10            1996
g
166
55 Tunisia 9,457 2,100 5,478 0.383                 40.20            1990
c
148
56 Thailand 61,691 1,960 5,599 0.350                 41.40            1998
c
690
57 Dominican Republic 8,404 1,910 4,653 0.410                 48.70            1996
g
120
58 El Salvador 6,189 1,900 4,048 0.469                 52.30            1996
g
180
59 Iran 62,977 1,760 5,163 0.341                 42.90            1984
c
164
60 Guatemala 11,086 1,660 3,517 0.472                 59.60            1989
g
233
61 Paraguay 5,359 1,580 4,193 0.377                 59.10            1995
g
76
62 Algeria 29,950 1,550 4,753 0.326                 35.30            1995
c
389Table A-1: Data
Country Population GNP GNP (PPP) PPP deflator Gini Year of Gini Net aid
63 Romania 22,458 1,520 5,647 0.269                 28.20            1994
g
356
64 Jordan 4,693 1,500 3,542 0.423                 36.40            1997
c
408
65 Egypt 62,430 1,400 3,303 0.424                 28.90            1995
c
1915
66 Bulgaria 8,216 1,380 4,914 0.281                 28.30            1995
c
232
67 Ecuador 12,409 1,310 2,605 0.503                 43.70            1995
c
176
68 Kazakhstan 15,438 1,230 4,408 0.279                 35.40            1996
c
207
69 Morocco 28,238 1,200 3,190 0.376                 39.50            1998-99
c
528
70 Philippines 76,785 1,020 3,815 0.267                 46.20            1997
c
607
71 Bolivia 8,135 1,010 2,193 0.461                 42.00            1990
g
628
72 Sri Lanka 18,985 820 3,056 0.268                 34.40            1995
c
490
73 Papua New Guinea 4,705 800 2,263 0.354                 50.90            1996
c
361
74 China 1,249,671 780 3,291 0.237                 40.30            1998
g
2359
75 Honduras 6,325 760 2,254 0.337                 53.70            1996
g
318
76 Ukraine 49,908 750 3,142 0.239                 32.50            1996
c
380
77 Uzbekistan 24,600 720 2,092 0.344                 33.30            1993
g
144
78 Cote d'Ivoire 14,729 710 1,546 0.459                 36.70            1995
c
798
79 Turkmenistan 4,779 660 3,099 0.213                 40.80            1998
c
17
80 Cameroon 14,691 580 1,444 0.402                 49.00            1983
c,d
424
81 Indonesia 207,022 580 2,439 0.238                 36.50            1996
g
1258
82 Lesotho 2,105 550 2,058 0.267                 56.00            1986-87
c
66
83 Zimbabwe 11,904 520 2,470 0.211                 56.80            1990-91
c
280
84 Guinea 7,247 510 1,761 0.290                 40.30            1994
c
359
85 Senegal 9,285 510 1,341 0.380                 41.30            1995
c
502
86 Armenia 3,809 490 2,210 0.222                 39.39            1989
g,d
138
87 Pakistan 134,790 470 1,757 0.268                 31.20            1996-97
c
1050
88 India 997,515 450 2,149 0.209                 37.80            1997
c
1595
89 Nicaragua 4,919 430 2,154 0.200                 50.30            1991
c
562
90 Ghana 18,949 390 1,793 0.218                 32.70            1997
c
701
91 Mauritania 2,598 380 1,522 0.250                 38.90            1995
c
171
92 Vietnam 77,515 370 1,755 0.211                 36.10            1998
c
1163
93 Bangladesh 127,669 370 1,475 0.251                 33.60            1995-96
c
1251
94 Moldova 4,281 370 2,358 0.157                 34.40            1992
g
33
95 Kenya 29,410 360 975 0.369                 44.50            1994
c
474
96 Yemen 17,048 350 688 0.509                 39.50            1992
c
310
97 Mongolia 2,623 350 1,496 0.234                 33.20            1995
c
203
98 Gambia 1,251 340 1,492 0.228                 47.80            1992
c
38
99 Sudan 28,993 330 1,298 0.254                 38.72            1968
g,d
209
100 Uganda 21,479 320 1,136 0.282                 39.20            1992-93
c
471
101 Zambia 9,881 320 686 0.466                 49.80            1996
c
349
102 Nigeria 123,897 310 744 0.417                 50.60            1996-97
c
204
103 Kyrgyz Republic 4,744 300 2,223 0.135                 40.50            1997
g
216
104 Central African Republic 3,540 290 1,131 0.256                 61.30            1993
c
120
105 Lao PDR 5,097 280 1,726 0.162                 30.40            1992
c
281
106 Cambodia 11,757 260 1,286 0.202                 40.40            1997
c
337
107 Madagascar 15,051 250 766 0.326                 46.00            1993
c
494
108 Tanzania 32,923 240 478 0.502                 38.20            1993
c
998
109 Mali 10,911 240 693 0.346                 50.50            1994
c
349
110 Burkina Faso 10,996 240 898 0.267                 48.20            1994
c
397
111 Mozambique 17,264 230 797 0.289                 39.60            1996-97
c
1039
112 Nepal 23,384 220 1,219 0.180                 36.70            1995-96
c
404
113 Malawi 10,788 190 581 0.327                 62.00            1993
c,d
434
114 Niger 10,493 190 727 0.261                 50.50            1995
c
291
115 Guinea-Bissau 1,185 160 595 0.269                 56.20            1991
c
96
116 Sierra Leone 4,949 130 414 0.314                 62.90            1989
c
106
117 Burundi 6,678 120 553 0.217                 33.30            1992
c
77
118 Ethiopia 62,782 100 599 0.167                 40.00            1991
c
648
c       Gini coefficient based on consumption or net income data.
g       Gini coefficient based on gross income data.
d       Value of Gini from Deininger and Squire (1996).
Population in thousands, GNP in PPP dollars per capita, net aid in billions of nominal dollars.Table A-2 - Baseline Tax System - Decentralized 30% Income Tax 
Average full Average  GNP Unemp- Labor income Consumption Consump. Percentiles Non-Tradables PPP
time income Labor Supply Consump. loyment Gini Gini 5% 50% 95% Average Price index
World 15,849           0.25 5,060            0% 0.72 0.68 609 1,814 27,860 0.27 3,191
1 144,746         0.28 44,631          0% 0.27 0.19 30,823 38,251 78,910 0.35 26,801 1.19
2 122,228         0.28 38,344          0% 0.33 0.23 24,502 30,469 76,653 0.36 22,137 1.11
3 106,970         0.28 32,887          0% 0.26 0.18 23,051 28,522 56,888 0.33 20,712 1.08
4 105,064         0.28 32,239          0% 0.25 0.18 22,804 28,174 54,951 0.33 20,503 1.07
5 104,411         0.28 32,025          0% 0.25 0.17 22,711 28,038 54,382 0.33 20,426 1.07
6 95,093           0.27 30,636          0% 0.41 0.29 17,692 21,206 70,711 0.38 17,003 1.00
7 92,632           0.27 29,618          0% 0.39 0.27 17,592 21,404 65,849 0.37 16,792 1.00
8 85,043           0.28 25,975          0% 0.23 0.16 18,830 23,112 42,639 0.32 17,283 1.01
9 81,421           0.28 25,332          0% 0.30 0.21 16,776 20,888 47,722 0.34 15,779 0.97
10 81,572           0.28 25,030          0% 0.25 0.18 17,705 21,896 42,838 0.32 16,409 0.99
11 79,891           0.28 24,515          0% 0.25 0.18 17,340 21,445 41,955 0.32 16,112 0.98
12 77,597           0.28 24,320          0% 0.33 0.23 15,614 19,420 48,292 0.34 14,881 0.95
13 77,365           0.28 23,775          0% 0.26 0.18 16,699 20,658 40,974 0.32 15,600 0.97
14 71,956           0.26 23,516          0% 0.45 0.32 12,961 15,008 57,210 0.38 13,111 0.91
15 74,897           0.28 23,474          0% 0.33 0.23 15,062 18,719 46,352 0.34 14,424 0.94
16 71,524           0.27 22,672          0% 0.36 0.26 13,889 17,100 47,868 0.35 13,548 0.92
17 63,482           0.27 20,044          0% 0.35 0.25 12,475 15,415 41,408 0.34 12,282 0.89
18 63,872           0.28 19,713          0% 0.27 0.19 13,556 16,845 35,265 0.32 13,010 0.91
19 61,815           0.28 19,312          0% 0.32 0.22 12,566 15,649 37,582 0.33 12,265 0.89
20 60,547           0.27 19,161          0% 0.36 0.25 11,823 14,595 40,332 0.34 11,736 0.87
21 55,230           0.27 17,458          0% 0.36 0.25 10,817 13,372 36,518 0.34 10,842 0.85
22 44,705           0.28 14,003          0% 0.33 0.23 9,005 11,195 27,561 0.32 9,169 0.80
23 42,361           0.26 13,783          0% 0.44 0.31 7,711 9,042 33,213 0.35 8,259 0.77
24 37,534           0.28 11,764          0% 0.33 0.23 7,548 9,381 23,229 0.31 7,854 0.76
25 33,545           0.27 10,603          0% 0.36 0.25 6,570 8,122 22,180 0.32 6,991 0.73
26 32,091           0.28 9,895            0% 0.27 0.19 6,833 8,489 17,572 0.29 7,119 0.74
27 26,006           0.26 8,488            0% 0.45 0.31 4,701 5,468 20,549 0.33 5,360 0.67
28 18,240           0.26 5,906            0% 0.43 0.30 3,358 3,985 13,932 0.31 3,955 0.61
29 16,483           0.28 5,063            0% 0.25 0.18 3,565 4,408 8,693 0.27 4,007 0.61
30 13,744           0.24 4,737            0% 0.57 0.40 2,262 2,752 13,275 0.33 3,009 0.56
31 14,923           0.28 4,653            0% 0.31 0.22 3,055 3,806 8,931 0.28 3,529 0.59
32 14,360           0.27 4,570            0% 0.38 0.26 2,761 3,383 9,921 0.29 3,278 0.58
33 12,588           0.24 4,422            0% 0.60 0.42 2,023 2,501 12,682 0.33 2,800 0.55
34 12,957           0.25 4,400            0% 0.54 0.38 2,178 2,613 11,996 0.32 2,853 0.55
35 13,678           0.27 4,394            0% 0.40 0.28 2,566 3,096 9,998 0.30 3,098 0.57
36 12,639           0.28 3,963            0% 0.33 0.23 2,538 3,157 7,896 0.28 3,009 0.56
37 11,056           0.26 3,672            0% 0.49 0.34 1,933 2,268 9,528 0.31 2,498 0.53
38 11,860           0.29 3,591            0% 0.19 0.14 2,732 3,297 5,491 0.24 3,148 0.57
39 10,618           0.25 3,580            0% 0.52 0.37 1,807 2,153 9,691 0.31 2,398 0.53
40 11,023           0.27 3,483            0% 0.35 0.25 2,162 2,671 7,217 0.28 2,629 0.54
41 10,263           0.26 3,399            0% 0.48 0.34 1,803 2,111 8,743 0.31 2,343 0.52
42 7,415             0.13 3,349            21% 0.90 0.63 1,005 1,368 2,860 0.18 3,841 0.61
43 8,014             0.19 3,235            1% 0.78 0.55 1,111 1,578 6,922 0.30 2,264 0.52
44 7,324             0.16 3,161            7% 0.85 0.59 948 1,430 3,176 0.25 2,624 0.54
45 8,224             0.21 3,067            0% 0.69 0.48 1,236 1,618 8,771 0.32 2,020 0.50
46 8,277             0.24 2,898            0% 0.59 0.42 1,334 1,646 8,285 0.32 1,933 0.49
47 8,320             0.26 2,741            0% 0.47 0.33 1,475 1,719 6,861 0.29 1,954 0.49
48 8,425             0.28 2,627            0% 0.31 0.22 1,724 2,146 5,042 0.26 2,134 0.51
49 7,975             0.26 2,620            0% 0.46 0.32 1,421 1,652 6,498 0.29 1,885 0.49
50 7,891             0.28 2,470            0% 0.32 0.23 1,593 1,980 4,873 0.26 1,994 0.50
51 7,278             0.26 2,391            0% 0.46 0.32 1,298 1,508 5,982 0.29 1,739 0.48
52 6,909             0.25 2,329            0% 0.52 0.37 1,177 1,401 6,306 0.30 1,643 0.47
53 6,021             0.21 2,271            0% 0.70 0.49 896 1,184 6,258 0.31 1,557 0.46
54 6,506             0.24 2,248            0% 0.57 0.40 1,068 1,301 6,398 0.30 1,558 0.46
55 6,059             0.24 2,098            0% 0.58 0.40 990 1,210 5,923 0.30 1,464 0.46
56 5,603             0.24 1,960            0% 0.59 0.42 905 1,115 5,670 0.30 1,371 0.45
57 5,750             0.26 1,912            0% 0.49 0.34 1,002 1,178 4,937 0.29 1,404 0.45
58 5,635             0.25 1,898            0% 0.52 0.36 960 1,142 5,077 0.29 1,373 0.45
59 4,973             0.23 1,761            0% 0.61 0.43 791 986 5,145 0.30 1,241 0.43
60 4,737             0.24 1,660            0% 0.60 0.42 764 942 4,811 0.30 1,184 0.43
61 4,523             0.24 1,581            0% 0.59 0.41 731 900 4,512 0.29 1,136 0.42
62 4,637             0.25 1,549            0% 0.50 0.35 800 945 4,058 0.28 1,159 0.43
63 4,910             0.28 1,519            0% 0.28 0.20 1,032 1,285 2,767 0.24 1,351 0.45Table A-2 - Baseline Tax System - Decentralized 30% Income Tax 
Average full Average  GNP Unemp- Labor income Consumption Consump. Percentiles Non-Tradables PPP
time income Labor Supply Consump. loyment Gini Gini 5% 50% 95% Average Price index
64 4,449             0.25 1,498            0% 0.52 0.36 758 902 4,008 0.28 1,115 0.42
65 4,339             0.27 1,395            0% 0.41 0.29 811 975 3,170 0.26 1,127 0.42
66 4,296             0.27 1,381            0% 0.41 0.28 804 968 3,128 0.26 1,117 0.42
67 3,674             0.23 1,310            0% 0.62 0.44 580 727 3,843 0.29 955 0.40
68 3,675             0.25 1,230            0% 0.51 0.35 633 749 3,234 0.27 944 0.40
69 3,480             0.24 1,199            0% 0.57 0.40 573 697 3,361 0.28 898 0.40
70 2,792             0.22 1,022            0% 0.66 0.46 428 550 2,937 0.28 766 0.38
71 3,129             0.27 1,011            0% 0.42 0.29 578 688 2,348 0.25 840 0.39
72 2,463             0.26 817               0% 0.49 0.34 430 505 2,097 0.26 666 0.36
73 2,084             0.20 801               0% 0.73 0.51 304 410 2,143 0.27 629 0.36
74 2,428             0.27 780               0% 0.40 0.28 455 549 1,775 0.24 677 0.37
75 2,237             0.25 760               0% 0.54 0.38 376 451 2,093 0.26 608 0.35
76 2,285             0.26 753               0% 0.47 0.33 405 472 1,884 0.25 627 0.36
77 2,293             0.28 720               0% 0.33 0.23 459 570 1,443 0.23 669 0.36
78 2,098             0.25 709               0% 0.53 0.37 356 425 1,934 0.26 575 0.35
79 1,900             0.24 660               0% 0.58 0.41 310 379 1,868 0.26 528 0.34
80 1,543             0.21 580               0% 0.70 0.49 230 303 1,607 0.26 468 0.33
81 1,830             0.27 581               0% 0.37 0.26 355 437 1,237 0.23 538 0.34
82 1,336             0.18 550               2% 0.80 0.56 181 263 999 0.24 491 0.33
83 1,252             0.17 521               3% 0.81 0.57 166 246 852 0.23 480 0.33
84 1,473             0.24 511               0% 0.58 0.40 241 294 1,443 0.25 422 0.32
85 1,460             0.24 510               0% 0.59 0.41 236 290 1,472 0.26 419 0.32
86 1,533             0.27 491               0% 0.39 0.28 290 352 1,090 0.23 454 0.32
87 1,443             0.26 471               0% 0.45 0.31 261 304 1,146 0.24 421 0.32
88 1,319             0.25 449               0% 0.54 0.38 221 266 1,230 0.25 382 0.31
89 1,126             0.20 432               0% 0.72 0.51 165 221 1,163 0.25 365 0.30
90 1,188             0.26 391               0% 0.47 0.33 211 246 974 0.23 353 0.30
91 1,110             0.24 380               0% 0.56 0.39 184 223 1,068 0.24 328 0.29
92 1,101             0.25 370               0% 0.52 0.36 188 224 997 0.24 326 0.29
93 1,119             0.26 370               0% 0.48 0.34 197 230 950 0.23 333 0.30
94 1,175             0.27 370               0% 0.35 0.24 232 288 760 0.21 368 0.31
95 1,000             0.23 360               0% 0.64 0.45 156 198 1,056 0.25 306 0.29
96 1,016             0.24 350               0% 0.57 0.40 167 203 981 0.24 304 0.29
97 1,061             0.26 351               0% 0.48 0.33 187 219 888 0.23 318 0.29
98 917                0.22 340               0% 0.68 0.48 139 180 981 0.25 291 0.28
99 1,032             0.27 330               0% 0.39 0.27 197 240 729 0.22 321 0.29
100 932                0.24 320               0% 0.56 0.39 154 187 905 0.24 282 0.28
101 842                0.21 320               0% 0.71 0.50 124 165 867 0.24 278 0.28
102 811                0.20 310               0% 0.72 0.50 119 159 841 0.24 272 0.28
103 934                0.27 300               0% 0.41 0.28 175 210 680 0.22 292 0.28
104 653                0.14 289               14% 0.88 0.61 87 125 235 0.16 374 0.31
105 861                0.26 280               0% 0.44 0.31 157 184 665 0.22 268 0.28
106 749                0.24 260               0% 0.58 0.40 122 149 744 0.23 233 0.26
107 685                0.22 250               0% 0.66 0.46 106 135 731 0.24 221 0.26
108 703                0.25 240               0% 0.55 0.38 118 142 668 0.23 220 0.26
109 627                0.20 240               0% 0.72 0.50 92 123 639 0.23 217 0.26
110 643                0.21 240               0% 0.69 0.48 97 126 686 0.24 214 0.26
111 668                0.24 230               0% 0.57 0.40 110 134 653 0.23 210 0.26
112 649                0.25 219               0% 0.52 0.37 111 132 592 0.22 205 0.25
113 425                0.14 190               16% 0.88 0.62 57 80 157 0.15 274 0.28
114 496                0.20 190               0% 0.72 0.50 73 97 505 0.23 176 0.24
115 388                0.18 160               2% 0.80 0.56 52 76 289 0.20 167 0.24
116 288                0.13 130               21% 0.90 0.63 39 53 112 0.12 220 0.26
117 363                0.26 120               0% 0.48 0.33 64 75 306 0.20 124 0.21
118 289                0.24 100               0% 0.57 0.40 47 58 285 0.21 101 0.20Table A-3a - Comparison of the Optimal Decentralized and World Taxes, v=2.0.
GNP
dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT
Wld. 0.41      0.62   1,539     3,112     0.75 0.79 0.69 0.25 0.21 0.09 5,027     5,016     0.22 0.13 3,371 7,687
1 0.21      0.62   10,290   3,112     0.25 0.27 0.20 0.23 0.31 0.33 48,249   21,885   0.38 0.22 26,416 21,390 1.17 1.23
2 0.28      0.62   10,862   3,112     0.33 0.34 0.24 0.29 0.28 0.32 39,163   18,788   0.37 0.23 22,000 16,886 1.09 1.12
3 0.19      0.62   6,794     3,112     0.24 0.27 0.19 0.22 0.32 0.32 36,341   16,491   0.38 0.20 20,369 17,038 1.06 1.13
4 0.19      0.62   6,778     3,112     0.23 0.26 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.31 35,523   16,209   0.37 0.20 20,195 16,991 1.05 1.12
5 0.19      0.62   6,756     3,112     0.23 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.32 0.31 35,256   16,112   0.37 0.20 20,121 16,947 1.05 1.12
6 0.36      0.62   10,373   3,112     0.43 0.44 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.29 29,058   15,072   0.35 0.25 17,525 12,467 1.00 1.00
7 0.34      0.62   9,640     3,112     0.40 0.42 0.27 0.33 0.26 0.29 28,616   14,675   0.35 0.25 17,075 12,596 0.99 1.00
8 0.16      0.62   4,690     3,112     0.21 0.25 0.17 0.19 0.33 0.30 29,358   13,338   0.36 0.19 17,007 14,760 0.99 1.07
9 0.24      0.62   6,402     3,112     0.29 0.33 0.22 0.25 0.30 0.29 26,758   12,923   0.36 0.21 15,567 12,884 0.96 1.01
10 0.19      0.62   5,262     3,112     0.23 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.32 0.30 27,581   12,871   0.36 0.19 16,163 13,891 0.97 1.04
11 0.19      0.62   5,154     3,112     0.23 0.27 0.19 0.20 0.32 0.30 27,012   12,632   0.36 0.19 15,870 13,664 0.97 1.04
12 0.27      0.62   6,745     3,112     0.32 0.36 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.29 24,995   12,419   0.36 0.22 14,757 12,031 0.94 0.99
13 0.19      0.62   4,945     3,112     0.23 0.28 0.19 0.21 0.32 0.29 26,232   12,281   0.36 0.20 15,343 13,222 0.95 1.02
14 0.39      0.62   8,440     3,112     0.48 0.50 0.29 0.37 0.23 0.27 21,669   11,853   0.33 0.25 13,907 9,955 0.92 0.92
15 0.27      0.62   6,511     3,112     0.32 0.36 0.23 0.27 0.29 0.29 24,125   12,034   0.35 0.22 14,305 11,721 0.93 0.98
16 0.31      0.62   6,983     3,112     0.37 0.40 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.28 22,433   11,617   0.35 0.23 13,612 10,853 0.91 0.95
17 0.30      0.62   5,962     3,112     0.35 0.40 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.27 20,114   10,454   0.34 0.22 12,274 10,153 0.88 0.93
18 0.21      0.62   4,504     3,112     0.25 0.31 0.20 0.21 0.31 0.28 21,344   10,390   0.35 0.20 12,814 11,184 0.90 0.96
19 0.26      0.62   5,252     3,112     0.31 0.36 0.23 0.25 0.29 0.27 19,975   10,161   0.35 0.21 12,150 10,373 0.88 0.94
20 0.30      0.62   5,731     3,112     0.36 0.41 0.25 0.28 0.27 0.26 19,189   10,050   0.34 0.22 11,730 9,768 0.87 0.91
21 0.30      0.62   5,267     3,112     0.36 0.41 0.25 0.27 0.27 0.25 17,417   9,293     0.34 0.21 10,858 9,250 0.85 0.90
22 0.27      0.62   3,905     3,112     0.32 0.39 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.24 14,368   7,764     0.33 0.20 9,098 8,344 0.80 0.86
23 0.39      0.62   4,916     3,112     0.47 0.52 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.21 12,722   7,657     0.31 0.21 8,717 7,581 0.79 0.83
24 0.27      0.62   3,266     3,112     0.32 0.41 0.23 0.22 0.29 0.21 12,089   6,772     0.33 0.19 7,788 7,562 0.76 0.83
25 0.30      0.62   3,195     3,112     0.36 0.45 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.20 10,589   6,277     0.32 0.19 6,998 7,065 0.73 0.81
26 0.21      0.62   2,288     3,112     0.25 0.36 0.20 0.17 0.31 0.20 10,687   5,933     0.32 0.17 7,017 7,185 0.73 0.81
27 0.39      0.62   3,033     3,112     0.47 0.56 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.15 7,841     5,480     0.29 0.18 5,671 6,396 0.69 0.77
28 0.37      0.62   2,046     3,112     0.45 0.56 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.12 5,540     4,486     0.28 0.16 4,114 5,955 0.62 0.74
29 0.19      0.62   1,059     3,112     0.23 0.39 0.19 0.08 0.32 0.10 5,581     3,950     0.30 0.15 3,943 5,617 0.62 0.71
30 0.49      0.62   1,975     3,112     0.63 0.68 0.32 0.19 0.17 0.09 4,049     4,317     0.23 0.15 3,736 6,147 0.61 0.75
31 0.26      0.62   1,243     3,112     0.30 0.44 0.22 0.09 0.29 0.09 4,841     3,901     0.29 0.15 3,491 5,617 0.59 0.71
32 0.32      0.62   1,422     3,112     0.38 0.51 0.26 0.11 0.27 0.09 4,506     3,974     0.29 0.15 3,298 5,714 0.58 0.72
33 0.52      0.62   1,928     3,112     0.67 0.71 0.32 0.19 0.15 0.08 3,712     4,274     0.21 0.14 3,747 6,247 0.61 0.76
34 0.46      0.62   1,772     3,112     0.59 0.66 0.32 0.17 0.18 0.09 3,820     4,167     0.24 0.15 3,373 6,050 0.59 0.74
35 0.35      0.62   1,454     3,112     0.42 0.53 0.27 0.12 0.25 0.09 4,214     3,962     0.28 0.15 3,169 5,747 0.58 0.72
36 0.28      0.62   1,127     3,112     0.32 0.45 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.08 4,041     3,737     0.28 0.14 2,992 5,578 0.57 0.69
37 0.43      0.62   1,398     3,112     0.53 0.60 0.30 0.12 0.21 0.08 3,275     3,883     0.25 0.14 2,768 5,897 0.56 0.72
38 0.13      0.62   521        3,112     0.17 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.34 0.06 4,172     3,485     0.28 0.14 3,107 5,324 0.58 0.64
39 0.45      0.62   1,418     3,112     0.57 0.63 0.31 0.13 0.19 0.08 3,128     3,905     0.24 0.14 2,774 5,983 0.56 0.73
40 0.30      0.62   1,043     3,112     0.35 0.46 0.25 0.07 0.27 0.07 3,485     3,654     0.28 0.14 2,629 5,603 0.55 0.69
41 0.42      0.62   1,273     3,112     0.52 0.59 0.30 0.11 0.21 0.07 3,062     3,802     0.25 0.14 2,565 5,879 0.54 0.72
42 0.81      0.62   2,528     3,112     0.97 0.94 0.19 0.28 0.02 0.04 3,132     4,420     0.05 0.08 14,645 11,733 0.94 1.01
43 0.68      0.62   1,857     3,112     0.88 0.85 0.28 0.22 0.06 0.06 2,737     4,211     0.11 0.12 5,277 7,479 0.67 0.82
44 0.74      0.62   2,095     3,112     0.94 0.90 0.24 0.25 0.04 0.05 2,814     4,294     0.07 0.10 8,014 8,870 0.77 0.89
45 0.61      0.62   1,519     3,112     0.78 0.77 0.31 0.17 0.10 0.06 2,509     4,012     0.15 0.13 3,497 6,669 0.59 0.78
46 0.52      0.62   1,257     3,112     0.66 0.68 0.32 0.13 0.15 0.07 2,434     3,825     0.20 0.13 2,561 6,227 0.54 0.74
47 0.41      0.62   1,012     3,112     0.50 0.56 0.30 0.08 0.22 0.06 2,487     3,632     0.25 0.13 2,112 5,867 0.52 0.71
48 0.26      0.62   702        3,112     0.30 0.35 0.22 0.04 0.29 0.05 2,733     3,458     0.27 0.13 2,111 5,555 0.52 0.66
49 0.40      0.62   960        3,112     0.50 0.54 0.30 0.07 0.22 0.06 2,388     3,600     0.25 0.13 2,026 5,861 0.51 0.70
50 0.26      0.62   672        3,112     0.31 0.36 0.23 0.04 0.29 0.05 2,556     3,450     0.27 0.13 1,975 5,598 0.51 0.66
51 0.40      0.62   876        3,112     0.50 0.53 0.30 0.07 0.22 0.06 2,179     3,557     0.25 0.13 1,869 5,883 0.50 0.70
52 0.45      0.62   923        3,112     0.57 0.59 0.31 0.08 0.19 0.06 2,033     3,604     0.22 0.13 1,903 6,041 0.50 0.72
53 0.60      0.62   1,133     3,112     0.80 0.77 0.32 0.14 0.10 0.06 1,884     3,809     0.15 0.12 2,719 6,829 0.55 0.78
54 0.49      0.62   945        3,112     0.63 0.64 0.32 0.09 0.16 0.06 1,913     3,638     0.21 0.12 1,960 6,198 0.50 0.73
55 0.50      0.62   891        3,112     0.64 0.64 0.32 0.09 0.16 0.06 1,774     3,611     0.20 0.12 1,869 6,234 0.50 0.73
56 0.51      0.62   841        3,112     0.66 0.65 0.33 0.09 0.15 0.05 1,661     3,600     0.20 0.12 1,786 6,320 0.49 0.74
57 0.43      0.62   726        3,112     0.53 0.54 0.31 0.06 0.21 0.05 1,710     3,501     0.23 0.12 1,556 6,028 0.47 0.70
58 0.45      0.62   751        3,112     0.57 0.57 0.31 0.07 0.19 0.05 1,660     3,522     0.22 0.12 1,587 6,105 0.48 0.71
59 0.53      0.62   777        3,112     0.69 0.66 0.32 0.09 0.14 0.05 1,477     3,579     0.18 0.12 1,700 6,440 0.49 0.74
60 0.51      0.62   717        3,112     0.66 0.64 0.32 0.08 0.15 0.05 1,402     3,543     0.19 0.12 1,558 6,396 0.47 0.74
61 0.51      0.62   683        3,112     0.66 0.63 0.32 0.07 0.15 0.05 1,329     3,525     0.19 0.12 1,494 6,403 0.47 0.74
62 0.43      0.62   593        3,112     0.54 0.53 0.31 0.05 0.20 0.05 1,382     3,457     0.22 0.12 1,296 6,149 0.45 0.71
63 0.23      0.62   368        3,112     0.27 0.28 0.21 0.02 0.30 0.04 1,624     3,384     0.26 0.12 1,333 5,807 0.45 0.66
64 0.45      0.62   593        3,112     0.57 0.55 0.31 0.06 0.19 0.05 1,310     3,461     0.21 0.12 1,289 6,210 0.45 0.71
Average
Tax rate Demogrant Labor Consump. index
PPP Gini Coefficients
Labor Supply Consumption Average
Nontradables
Price
AverageTable A-3a - Comparison of the Optimal Decentralized and World Taxes, v=2.0.
GNP
dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT
Average
Tax rate Demogrant Labor Consump. index
PPP Gini Coefficients




65 0.35      0.62   467        3,112     0.42 0.42 0.27 0.04 0.25 0.04 1,331     3,401     0.24 0.12 1,155 6,016 0.44 0.69
66 0.35      0.62   464        3,112     0.42 0.42 0.27 0.04 0.25 0.04 1,315     3,400     0.24 0.12 1,147 6,019 0.44 0.69
67 0.54      0.62   588        3,112     0.70 0.65 0.32 0.07 0.13 0.05 1,092     3,502     0.17 0.11 1,350 6,624 0.46 0.75
68 0.45      0.62   481        3,112     0.55 0.52 0.31 0.05 0.19 0.05 1,079     3,423     0.21 0.12 1,076 6,283 0.43 0.71
69 0.49      0.62   500        3,112     0.63 0.58 0.32 0.06 0.17 0.05 1,025     3,448     0.19 0.11 1,115 6,460 0.43 0.73
70 0.57      0.62   483        3,112     0.75 0.67 0.32 0.07 0.11 0.04 846        3,478     0.15 0.11 1,197 6,947 0.44 0.77
71 0.36      0.62   345        3,112     0.44 0.43 0.28 0.04 0.24 0.04 956        3,388     0.23 0.11 868 6,249 0.40 0.71
72 0.42      0.62   309        3,112     0.53 0.49 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.04 733        3,390     0.21 0.11 734 6,514 0.38 0.73
73 0.63      0.62   416        3,112     0.82 0.72 0.31 0.08 0.08 0.04 665        3,478     0.12 0.10 1,198 7,525 0.44 0.82
74 0.35      0.62   258        3,112     0.42 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.25 0.04 748        3,383     0.23 0.11 692 6,414 0.38 0.72
75 0.46      0.62   306        3,112     0.59 0.53 0.32 0.05 0.18 0.04 659        3,396     0.19 0.11 719 6,678 0.38 0.74
76 0.41      0.62   281        3,112     0.51 0.47 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.04 678        3,386     0.21 0.11 682 6,541 0.38 0.73
77 0.27      0.62   200        3,112     0.33 0.34 0.24 0.03 0.29 0.04 739        3,381     0.23 0.11 663 6,393 0.37 0.72
78 0.45      0.62   281        3,112     0.58 0.52 0.32 0.04 0.19 0.04 622        3,392     0.20 0.11 666 6,707 0.37 0.75
79 0.51      0.62   281        3,112     0.65 0.57 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.04 557        3,398     0.17 0.10 679 6,899 0.38 0.76
80 0.60      0.62   289        3,112     0.79 0.68 0.32 0.06 0.10 0.04 481        3,428     0.12 0.10 813 7,562 0.40 0.82
81 0.31      0.62   178        3,112     0.37 0.37 0.25 0.03 0.27 0.04 575        3,381     0.22 0.11 540 6,596 0.35 0.74
82 0.70      0.62   328        3,112     0.90 0.78 0.27 0.08 0.05 0.04 470        3,469     0.08 0.08 1,237 8,712 0.44 0.91
83 0.72      0.62   322        3,112     0.91 0.79 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.04 446        3,470     0.07 0.08 1,323 8,992 0.45 0.93
84 0.50      0.62   216        3,112     0.64 0.56 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.04 434        3,390     0.17 0.10 536 7,091 0.35 0.78
85 0.51      0.62   218        3,112     0.66 0.58 0.32 0.05 0.15 0.04 431        3,391     0.17 0.10 545 7,133 0.35 0.78
86 0.34      0.62   159        3,112     0.40 0.40 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.04 474        3,381     0.22 0.11 461 6,764 0.33 0.75
87 0.39      0.62   168        3,112     0.47 0.45 0.29 0.04 0.23 0.04 435        3,381     0.21 0.10 445 6,871 0.33 0.76
88 0.47      0.62   182        3,112     0.60 0.53 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.04 388        3,384     0.18 0.10 456 7,100 0.33 0.78
89 0.62      0.62   223        3,112     0.82 0.70 0.31 0.06 0.09 0.04 358        3,414     0.11 0.09 685 7,974 0.38 0.86
90 0.41      0.62   144        3,112     0.50 0.47 0.30 0.04 0.22 0.04 355        3,381     0.20 0.10 380 7,061 0.32 0.78
91 0.49      0.62   158        3,112     0.62 0.54 0.32 0.04 0.17 0.04 325        3,384     0.17 0.10 403 7,276 0.32 0.80
92 0.45      0.62   146        3,112     0.57 0.51 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.04 324        3,381     0.18 0.10 376 7,203 0.31 0.79
93 0.43      0.62   140        3,112     0.52 0.48 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.04 331        3,381     0.19 0.10 368 7,132 0.31 0.78
94 0.29      0.62   108        3,112     0.34 0.35 0.24 0.03 0.28 0.04 374        3,381     0.21 0.10 367 6,938 0.31 0.77
95 0.55      0.62   165        3,112     0.72 0.62 0.32 0.05 0.13 0.04 298        3,389     0.14 0.09 450 7,604 0.33 0.83
96 0.49      0.62   146        3,112     0.63 0.55 0.32 0.04 0.17 0.04 299        3,383     0.17 0.10 377 7,375 0.31 0.80
97 0.41      0.62   130        3,112     0.51 0.48 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.04 318        3,381     0.19 0.10 346 7,173 0.31 0.79
98 0.59      0.62   164        3,112     0.77 0.65 0.32 0.05 0.11 0.04 281        3,394     0.12 0.09 478 7,878 0.34 0.85
99 0.33      0.62   105        3,112     0.39 0.39 0.27 0.03 0.26 0.04 321        3,381     0.21 0.10 325 7,086 0.30 0.78
100 0.49      0.62   133        3,112     0.62 0.55 0.32 0.04 0.17 0.04 274        3,383     0.17 0.10 347 7,443 0.31 0.81
101 0.62      0.62   163        3,112     0.81 0.68 0.31 0.06 0.09 0.04 263        3,398     0.11 0.09 515 8,145 0.35 0.87
102 0.63      0.62   161        3,112     0.82 0.69 0.30 0.06 0.08 0.04 255        3,398     0.10 0.09 519 8,242 0.35 0.88
103 0.35      0.62   101        3,112     0.42 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.25 0.04 286        3,381     0.20 0.10 299 7,191 0.29 0.79
104 0.78      0.62   207        3,112     0.96 0.85 0.21 0.08 0.03 0.03 265        3,444     0.04 0.06 1,322 12,118 0.45 1.15
105 0.38      0.62   98          3,112     0.46 0.44 0.29 0.04 0.23 0.04 260        3,381     0.20 0.10 281 7,298 0.29 0.80
106 0.50      0.62   110        3,112     0.64 0.56 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.04 220        3,381     0.16 0.09 298 7,672 0.29 0.83
107 0.57      0.62   117        3,112     0.74 0.63 0.32 0.05 0.12 0.04 206        3,385     0.13 0.09 343 8,027 0.30 0.86
108 0.47      0.62   98          3,112     0.60 0.54 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.04 207        3,381     0.17 0.09 264 7,658 0.28 0.83
109 0.63      0.62   124        3,112     0.82 0.68 0.30 0.06 0.08 0.04 197        3,392     0.10 0.08 414 8,485 0.32 0.90
110 0.60      0.62   118        3,112     0.78 0.66 0.31 0.05 0.10 0.04 197        3,386     0.11 0.09 368 8,242 0.31 0.88
111 0.49      0.62   96          3,112     0.63 0.55 0.32 0.04 0.17 0.04 197        3,381     0.16 0.09 261 7,748 0.28 0.84
112 0.45      0.62   86          3,112     0.57 0.52 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.04 192        3,381     0.17 0.09 236 7,683 0.27 0.83
113 0.80      0.62   139        3,112     0.96 0.85 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.03 174        3,420     0.04 0.05 1,027 13,287 0.42 1.26
114 0.63      0.62   98          3,112     0.82 0.68 0.30 0.06 0.08 0.04 156        3,386     0.10 0.08 337 8,707 0.30 0.92
115 0.70      0.62   96          3,112     0.90 0.76 0.27 0.06 0.05 0.04 138        3,396     0.07 0.07 420 10,026 0.32 1.03
116 0.81      0.62   98          3,112     0.97 0.86 0.19 0.08 0.02 0.03 121        3,406     0.03 0.05 843 15,187 0.40 1.41
117 0.42      0.62   45          3,112     0.51 0.48 0.30 0.04 0.21 0.04 108        3,381     0.17 0.09 135 8,155 0.22 0.87
118 0.50      0.62   42          3,112     0.64 0.56 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.04 85          3,381     0.14 0.08 127 8,589 0.22 0.91Table A-3b: Comparison of the Optimal Decentralized and World Income Taxes, Further Details.
5% 50% 95%
dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT
Wld. 5,027 5,016 2% 15% 0.0 0.0 566 4,962 1,599 6,198 28,784 14,043 -7,564,213 -4,384,246 0.1591 0.3795
1 48,249 49,451 0% 0% 0.0 27,565.3 32,464 12,348 41,230 19,210 86,927 41,261 -2,376,352 -3,225,743 2.0937 1.9854
2 39,163 41,293 0% 0% 0.0 22,504.5 24,788 9,527 31,076 15,368 78,748 40,416 -2,502,612 -3,379,862 1.5370 1.4922
3 36,341 35,243 0% 0% 0.0 18,751.5 24,674 9,807 31,402 14,641 64,349 30,025 -2,602,954 -3,454,813 1.4493 1.4359
4 35,523 34,499 0% 0% 0.0 18,289.9 24,399 9,792 30,940 14,491 61,895 29,013 -2,616,832 -3,467,047 1.4200 1.4207
5 35,256 34,245 0% 0% 0.0 18,132.2 24,293 9,771 30,775 14,430 61,200 28,718 -2,621,713 -3,471,425 1.4097 1.4140
6 29,058 31,504 0% 0% 0.0 16,432.0 17,373 6,835 20,198 10,808 65,683 37,657 -2,698,305 -3,608,738 1.0000 1.0000
7 28,616 30,459 0% 0% 0.0 15,783.9 17,349 6,971 20,732 10,977 62,845 35,082 -2,720,756 -3,612,741 0.9909 1.0136
8 29,358 26,938 0% 0% 0.0 13,599.3 20,571 8,537 26,016 12,123 49,454 22,713 -2,788,604 -3,624,308 1.1158 1.1531
9 26,758 25,842 0% 0% 0.0 12,919.9 17,342 7,335 22,015 10,955 51,181 25,508 -2,827,967 -3,666,763 0.9492 1.0162
10 27,581 25,707 0% 0% 0.0 12,835.6 18,943 8,004 24,047 11,520 48,257 22,878 -2,824,413 -3,656,582 1.0214 1.0820
11 27,012 25,077 0% 0% 0.0 12,445.3 18,553 7,875 23,551 11,306 47,262 22,430 -2,842,209 -3,671,775 0.9941 1.0586
12 24,995 24,516 0% 0% 0.0 12,097.3 15,856 6,814 19,938 10,220 50,056 25,878 -2,870,084 -3,707,399 0.8575 0.9374
13 26,232 24,153 0% 0% 0.0 11,871.9 17,862 7,615 22,720 10,924 46,272 21,942 -2,870,106 -3,695,599 0.9509 1.0178
14 21,669 23,026 0% 0% 0.0 11,172.5 12,695 5,413 14,568 7,875 50,730 30,763 -2,931,265 -3,812,202 0.6703 0.7298
15 24,125 23,503 0% 0% 0.0 11,468.5 15,295 6,641 19,218 9,891 48,044 24,877 -2,900,910 -3,731,676 0.8188 0.9053
16 22,433 22,404 0% 0% 0.0 10,787.1 13,827 6,092 16,935 9,061 47,212 25,748 -2,941,986 -3,774,286 0.7312 0.8247
17 20,114 19,341 0% 0% 0.0 8,886.8 12,502 5,747 15,464 8,305 41,590 22,403 -3,049,718 -3,846,992 0.6374 0.7511
18 21,344 19,171 0% 0% 0.0 8,781.0 14,287 6,451 18,188 9,100 38,951 19,090 -3,041,554 -3,830,559 0.7210 0.8249
19 19,975 18,570 0% 0% 0.0 8,408.1 12,816 5,932 16,165 8,476 39,263 20,371 -3,073,514 -3,856,716 0.6459 0.7638
20 19,189 18,277 0% 0% 0.0 8,226.4 11,830 5,528 14,611 7,913 40,394 21,872 -3,093,627 -3,878,108 0.5953 0.7139
21 17,417 16,283 0% 0% 0.0 6,989.7 10,812 5,260 13,346 7,353 36,416 19,906 -3,180,572 -3,932,527 0.5284 0.6618
22 14,368 12,256 0% 0% 0.0 4,491.4 9,137 4,828 11,475 6,380 28,503 15,256 -3,389,430 -4,048,590 0.4183 0.5705
23 12,722 11,973 0% 0% 0.0 4,315.9 7,539 4,228 8,612 5,226 29,598 18,335 -3,440,870 -4,085,889 0.3387 0.4979
24 12,089 9,642 0% 0% 0.0 2,870.2 7,663 4,411 9,628 5,531 24,066 13,041 -3,573,026 -4,136,052 0.3331 0.4973
25 10,589 8,339 0% 0% 0.0 2,061.5 6,566 4,107 8,109 4,918 22,130 12,542 -3,696,745 -4,182,949 0.2761 0.4522
26 10,687 7,432 0% 0% 0.0 1,498.7 7,194 4,291 9,145 5,160 19,344 10,086 -3,743,192 -4,214,879 0.2945 0.4552
27 7,841 6,238 0% 0% 0.0 758.2 4,605 3,584 5,276 4,053 18,292 11,785 -3,984,984 -4,266,042 0.1788 0.3776
28 5,540 3,619 0% 0% 0.0 -866.3 3,289 3,358 3,756 3,755 12,715 8,352 -4,438,514 -4,354,366 0.1149 0.3294
29 5,581 2,209 0% 0% 0.0 -1,741.2 3,812 3,434 4,844 3,650 9,805 5,561 -4,575,403 -4,401,519 0.1272 0.3110
30 4,049 3,176 0% 6% 0.0 -1,141.2 2,308 3,112 2,752 3,617 10,057 8,066 -4,778,796 -4,393,609 0.0736 0.3044
31 4,841 2,078 0% 0% 0.0 -1,822.3 3,126 3,343 3,952 3,603 9,393 5,715 -4,718,207 -4,405,774 0.1025 0.3047
32 4,506 2,272 0% 1% 0.0 -1,701.9 2,743 3,282 3,337 3,606 9,728 6,257 -4,774,669 -4,401,206 0.0894 0.3054
33 3,712 3,063 1% 10% 0.0 -1,211.3 2,120 3,112 2,559 3,584 9,078 7,763 -4,879,950 -4,406,617 0.0660 0.2983
34 3,820 2,780 0% 6% 0.0 -1,386.7 2,185 3,112 2,579 3,595 9,467 7,392 -4,882,837 -4,401,428 0.0684 0.3016
35 4,214 2,240 0% 1% 0.0 -1,721.7 2,527 3,242 2,979 3,591 9,438 6,309 -4,843,656 -4,404,327 0.0811 0.3029
36 4,041 1,646 0% 0% 0.0 -2,090.2 2,566 3,261 3,216 3,531 8,097 5,195 -4,961,715 -4,422,498 0.0802 0.2933
37 3,275 2,031 0% 5% 0.0 -1,851.6 1,900 3,112 2,205 3,534 7,981 6,098 -5,145,511 -4,422,268 0.0568 0.2928
38 4,172 985 0% 0% 0.0 -2,500.5 3,071 3,291 3,816 3,440 6,559 3,913 -5,051,082 -4,437,549 0.0900 0.2792
39 3,128 2,090 0% 7% 0.0 -1,815.0 1,798 3,112 2,110 3,527 7,781 6,192 -5,193,530 -4,425,147 0.0530 0.2914
40 3,485 1,429 0% 1% 0.0 -2,225.1 2,162 3,203 2,672 3,492 7,221 4,856 -5,171,398 -4,432,955 0.0650 0.2871
41 3,062 1,819 0% 6% 0.0 -1,983.0 1,774 3,112 2,055 3,511 7,455 5,689 -5,264,660 -4,430,319 0.0519 0.2893
42 3,132 3,446 77% 62% 0.0 -973.9 2,528 3,112 2,528 3,112 3,557 5,273 -5,171,903 -4,680,421 0.0452 0.2094
43 2,737 2,895 36% 36% 0.0 -1,315.4 1,857 3,112 1,992 3,335 3,702 4,711 -5,282,645 -4,500,764 0.0446 0.2634
44 2,814 3,114 59% 49% 0.0 -1,179.6 2,095 3,112 2,095 3,129 3,089 4,953 -5,264,397 -4,571,656 0.0441 0.2410
45 2,509 2,371 11% 24% 0.0 -1,640.9 1,519 3,112 1,810 3,438 5,321 5,724 -5,429,421 -4,461,176 0.0404 0.2770
46 2,434 1,879 0% 15% 0.0 -1,945.6 1,391 3,112 1,676 3,465 5,964 5,470 -5,543,585 -4,448,945 0.0381 0.2818
47 2,487 1,370 0% 8% 0.0 -2,261.5 1,447 3,112 1,670 3,456 5,928 4,707 -5,613,362 -4,449,045 0.0398 0.2811
48 2,733 912 0% 2% 0.0 -2,545.8 1,764 3,174 2,228 3,415 5,303 3,728 -5,606,155 -4,452,722 0.0487 0.2753
49 2,388 1,287 0% 8% 0.0 -2,312.9 1,393 3,112 1,605 3,447 5,657 4,518 -5,687,551 -4,452,400 0.0378 0.2796
50 2,556 893 0% 3% 0.0 -2,557.9 1,624 3,158 2,045 3,410 5,092 3,696 -5,718,895 -4,455,937 0.0441 0.2745
51 2,179 1,172 0% 9% 0.0 -2,384.3 1,272 3,112 1,465 3,431 5,207 4,252 -5,846,696 -4,458,642 0.0336 0.2771
52 2,033 1,297 0% 13% 0.0 -2,307.1 1,171 3,112 1,374 3,430 5,059 4,431 -5,912,365 -4,461,642 0.0303 0.2769
53 1,884 1,836 12% 29% 0.0 -1,972.6 1,133 3,112 1,345 3,368 3,836 4,409 -5,937,114 -4,486,887 0.0274 0.2684
54 1,913 1,388 0% 17% 0.0 -2,250.7 1,094 3,112 1,306 3,420 4,796 4,486 -5,983,882 -4,466,417 0.0278 0.2755
55 1,774 1,316 0% 18% 0.0 -2,295.4 1,017 3,112 1,217 3,407 4,378 4,237 -6,109,903 -4,471,342 0.0253 0.2739
56 1,661 1,287 0% 20% 0.0 -2,313.3 943 3,112 1,135 3,395 4,154 4,108 -6,237,810 -4,477,162 0.0230 0.2720
57 1,710 1,026 0% 13% 0.0 -2,475.2 988 3,112 1,148 3,400 4,153 3,900 -6,265,638 -4,472,782 0.0243 0.2726
58 1,660 1,081 0% 15% 0.0 -2,441.2 955 3,112 1,120 3,399 4,082 3,945 -6,288,349 -4,474,412 0.0233 0.2725
59 1,477 1,231 1% 23% 0.0 -2,347.8 839 3,112 1,019 3,375 3,635 4,104 -6,441,522 -4,485,807 0.0198 0.2695
60 1,402 1,136 0% 22% 0.0 -2,406.9 798 3,112 962 3,372 3,498 4,060 -6,558,073 -4,487,327 0.0185 0.2690
61 1,329 1,088 0% 22% 0.0 -2,436.4 760 3,112 915 3,368 3,262 4,041 -6,655,445 -4,489,671 0.0174 0.2684
62 1,382 910 0% 16% 0.0 -2,546.9 792 3,112 924 3,377 3,387 3,890 -6,680,140 -4,484,377 0.0182 0.2694
63 1,624 716 0% 2% 0.0 -2,667.1 1,078 3,164 1,369 3,378 3,007 3,616 -6,595,349 -4,475,803 0.0251 0.2693
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65 1,331 764 0% 9% 0.0 -2,637.9 797 3,112 933 3,374 2,967 3,750 -6,847,657 -4,484,557 0.0181 0.2686
66 1,315 760 0% 9% 0.0 -2,640.0 789 3,112 926 3,374 2,923 3,747 -6,868,371 -4,484,925 0.0179 0.2686
67 1,092 1,029 2% 27% 0.0 -2,473.1 623 3,112 760 3,339 2,656 4,084 -7,039,983 -4,503,472 0.0134 0.2647
68 1,079 821 0% 17% 0.0 -2,602.4 626 3,112 730 3,361 2,630 3,874 -7,163,034 -4,495,598 0.0134 0.2669
69 1,025 886 0% 22% 0.0 -2,561.6 584 3,112 697 3,349 2,546 3,965 -7,231,898 -4,501,435 0.0123 0.2656
70 846 967 5% 32% 0.0 -2,511.9 483 3,112 597 3,299 1,910 4,129 -7,576,648 -4,522,016 0.0097 0.2600
71 956 729 0% 11% 0.0 -2,659.2 567 3,112 653 3,365 2,167 3,756 -7,555,157 -4,499,011 0.0117 0.2668
72 733 735 0% 17% 0.0 -2,655.8 424 3,112 492 3,350 1,772 3,831 -8,094,484 -4,512,181 0.0081 0.2647
73 665 966 19% 40% 0.0 -2,512.3 416 3,112 480 3,233 1,251 4,256 -8,109,220 -4,549,222 0.0071 0.2524
74 748 714 0% 10% 0.0 -2,668.6 448 3,112 528 3,364 1,676 3,736 -8,158,550 -4,508,957 0.0085 0.2661
75 659 750 0% 22% 0.0 -2,646.5 378 3,112 446 3,337 1,654 3,899 -8,294,005 -4,519,325 0.0070 0.2631
76 678 723 0% 16% 0.0 -2,663.0 397 3,112 458 3,352 1,610 3,808 -8,288,913 -4,514,410 0.0074 0.2647
77 739 710 0% 5% 0.0 -2,671.2 466 3,117 585 3,372 1,494 3,662 -8,303,545 -4,508,919 0.0087 0.2668
78 622 739 0% 21% 0.0 -2,653.1 355 3,112 418 3,338 1,560 3,885 -8,464,838 -4,521,480 0.0064 0.2631
79 557 756 0% 26% 0.0 -2,642.8 319 3,112 382 3,318 1,372 3,952 -8,662,707 -4,529,693 0.0056 0.2610
80 481 832 12% 39% 0.0 -2,595.2 289 3,112 344 3,242 988 4,166 -8,961,332 -4,556,293 0.0046 0.2529
81 575 710 0% 7% 0.0 -2,671.1 354 3,112 434 3,369 1,223 3,696 -8,887,802 -4,519,429 0.0062 0.2658
82 470 941 42% 51% 0.0 -2,527.8 328 3,112 341 3,112 526 4,423 -8,988,526 -4,600,673 0.0045 0.2379
83 446 944 48% 53% 0.0 -2,525.7 322 3,112 325 3,112 476 4,461 -9,117,275 -4,611,606 0.0042 0.2350
84 434 733 0% 26% 0.0 -2,656.7 247 3,112 296 3,315 1,073 3,942 -9,357,600 -4,540,427 0.0040 0.2600
85 431 737 0% 28% 0.0 -2,654.5 245 3,112 295 3,310 1,078 3,965 -9,363,731 -4,542,040 0.0040 0.2594
86 474 710 0% 9% 0.0 -2,671.2 286 3,112 341 3,364 1,040 3,722 -9,374,872 -4,527,869 0.0047 0.2650
87 435 711 0% 14% 0.0 -2,670.7 256 3,112 293 3,355 1,022 3,780 -9,532,421 -4,532,568 0.0042 0.2639
88 388 718 0% 23% 0.0 -2,666.2 222 3,112 263 3,327 963 3,892 -9,720,412 -4,542,144 0.0035 0.2609
89 358 796 18% 42% 0.0 -2,617.5 223 3,112 258 3,209 683 4,208 -9,776,038 -4,575,815 0.0032 0.2489
90 355 711 0% 16% 0.0 -2,670.8 207 3,112 239 3,349 844 3,800 -10,098,315 -4,541,819 0.0032 0.2629
91 325 717 0% 24% 0.0 -2,666.9 187 3,112 221 3,322 813 3,913 -10,222,712 -4,550,603 0.0028 0.2599
92 324 711 0% 21% 0.0 -2,670.6 187 3,112 219 3,335 804 3,863 -10,293,126 -4,548,001 0.0028 0.2612
93 331 711 0% 17% 0.0 -2,670.8 193 3,112 223 3,346 799 3,820 -10,274,113 -4,545,133 0.0029 0.2623
94 374 711 0% 6% 0.0 -2,670.7 234 3,112 291 3,371 770 3,675 -10,158,772 -4,537,502 0.0036 0.2650
95 298 731 3% 33% 0.0 -2,658.1 170 3,112 209 3,279 708 4,035 -10,393,068 -4,563,841 0.0025 0.2555
96 299 716 0% 26% 0.0 -2,667.5 171 3,112 203 3,316 743 3,923 -10,483,914 -4,555,231 0.0025 0.2592
97 318 710 0% 17% 0.0 -2,670.8 184 3,112 213 3,346 764 3,813 -10,441,327 -4,547,193 0.0027 0.2623
98 281 745 8% 38% 0.0 -2,649.4 164 3,112 200 3,247 620 4,112 -10,547,785 -4,574,732 0.0023 0.2522
99 321 711 0% 9% 0.0 -2,670.7 194 3,112 234 3,366 703 3,717 -10,562,155 -4,544,358 0.0029 0.2641
100 274 715 0% 25% 0.0 -2,668.1 157 3,112 186 3,319 689 3,921 -10,768,137 -4,558,598 0.0022 0.2592
101 263 754 16% 41% 0.0 -2,643.8 163 3,112 190 3,215 508 4,166 -10,716,204 -4,585,369 0.0021 0.2490
102 255 755 18% 42% 0.0 -2,642.9 161 3,112 185 3,205 485 4,191 -10,804,750 -4,589,242 0.0021 0.2479
103 286 710 0% 10% 0.0 -2,671.0 172 3,112 201 3,362 635 3,734 -10,884,054 -4,549,296 0.0024 0.2636
104 265 876 70% 65% 0.0 -2,568.4 207 3,112 207 3,112 299 4,715 -10,801,604 -4,718,908 0.0019 0.2073
105 260 711 0% 13% 0.0 -2,670.8 154 3,112 176 3,357 600 3,766 -11,146,419 -4,554,026 0.0021 0.2628
106 220 710 0% 27% 0.0 -2,670.9 126 3,112 151 3,309 550 3,940 -11,473,267 -4,569,159 0.0017 0.2578
107 206 721 5% 36% 0.0 -2,664.6 118 3,112 146 3,261 477 4,063 -11,591,716 -4,583,001 0.0015 0.2529
108 207 711 0% 24% 0.0 -2,670.6 119 3,112 140 3,324 519 3,899 -11,744,699 -4,569,141 0.0015 0.2590
109 197 738 18% 43% 0.0 -2,653.8 124 3,112 143 3,200 368 4,179 -11,675,923 -4,600,356 0.0015 0.2470
110 197 724 11% 39% 0.0 -2,662.3 118 3,112 141 3,233 419 4,118 -11,711,240 -4,591,440 0.0015 0.2501
111 197 710 0% 26% 0.0 -2,671.2 112 3,112 134 3,314 494 3,924 -11,896,288 -4,572,911 0.0014 0.2580
112 192 710 0% 21% 0.0 -2,670.8 110 3,112 129 3,333 478 3,868 -12,067,201 -4,570,778 0.0014 0.2597
113 174 814 74% 67% 0.0 -2,606.7 139 3,112 139 3,112 197 4,736 -12,275,418 -4,753,606 0.0011 0.2012
114 156 723 18% 43% 0.0 -2,662.8 98 3,112 113 3,195 292 4,172 -12,529,872 -4,610,144 0.0011 0.2461
115 138 749 43% 54% 0.0 -2,646.8 96 3,112 100 3,112 153 4,395 -13,034,933 -4,656,915 0.0009 0.2321
116 121 776 78% 71% 0.0 -2,630.1 98 3,112 98 3,112 138 4,783 -13,779,409 -4,803,219 0.0007 0.1908
117 108 711 0% 17% 0.0 -2,670.6 63 3,112 73 3,348 261 3,814 -14,428,439 -4,592,803 0.0007 0.2597
118 85 710 0% 27% 0.0 -2,670.8 49 3,112 58 3,311 212 3,934 -15,303,253 -4,609,515 0.0005 0.2557Table A-4 - Sensitivity Analysis
Country
dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT
v=0.5
World 0.36     0.60     1,329     3,061     0.75 0.79 0.69 0.26 0.23 0.09 1% 13% 5,266              5,067              5,266 5,067 0.0 0.0
6 United States 0.30     0.60     9,244     3,061     0.41 0.44 0.29 0.35 0.27 0.30 0% 0% 30,569            15,655            30,569 31,811 0.0 16,155.7
36 Poland 0.21     0.60     913        3,061     0.31 0.44 0.24 0.08 0.31 0.08 0% 0% 4,275              3,749              4,275 1,739 0.0 -2,010.4
88 India 0.43     0.60     172        3,061     0.58 0.52 0.33 0.04 0.20 0.04 0% 21% 404                 3,342              404 709 0.0 -2,632.5
v=2.0
World 0.41     0.62     1,539     3,112     0.75 0.79 0.69 0.25 0.21 0.09 2% 15% 5,027              5,016              5,027 5,016 0.0 0.0
6 United States 0.36     0.62     10,373   3,112     0.43 0.44 0.28 0.35 0.25 0.29 0% 0% 29,058            15,072            29,058 31,504 0.0 16,432.0
36 Poland 0.28     0.62     1,127     3,112     0.32 0.45 0.23 0.08 0.28 0.08 0% 0% 4,041              3,737              4,041 1,646 0.0 -2,090.2
88 India 0.47     0.62     182        3,112     0.60 0.53 0.32 0.04 0.18 0.04 0% 23% 388                 3,384              388 718 0.0 -2,666.2
v=5.0
World 0.45     0.64     1,722     3,162     0.76 0.79 0.69 0.24 0.19 0.08 2% 16% 4,778              4,955              4,778 4,955 0.0 0.0
6 United States 0.41     0.64     11,252   3,162     0.45 0.45 0.26 0.35 0.23 0.29 0% 0% 27,598            14,433            27,598 31,147 0.0 16,713.8
36 Poland 0.33     0.64     1,280     3,162     0.34 0.45 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.07 0% 1% 3,837              3,722              3,837 1,548 0.0 -2,174.2
88 India 0.51     0.64     189        3,162     0.61 0.55 0.30 0.04 0.16 0.04 0% 25% 374                 3,425              374 725 0.0 -2,699.5
dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT dec. WIT
v=0.5
World 0.24     0.13     3,290     7,412     574 5,046 1,677 6,292 29,970 14,595 0.0007842 0.0009587 0.1982 0.4266
6 United States 0.38     0.26     17,033   12,504   1.00      1.00      17,691 7,077 21,167 11,203 70,509 39,202 0.0012300 0.0010700 1.0000 1.0000
36 Poland 0.31     0.15     2,941     5,351     0.57      0.68      2,641 3,243 3,390 3,513 8,714 5,349 0.0009000 0.0009500 0.2018 0.3506
88 India 0.20     0.10     434        6,744     0.33      0.76      223 3,061 265 3,288 1,031 3,848 0.0006500 0.0009400 0.0235 0.3201
v=2.0
World 0.22     0.13     3,371     7,687     566 4,962 1,599 6,198 28,784 14,043 -7564213 -4384246 0.1591 0.3795
6 United States 0.35     0.25     17,525   12,467   1.00      1.00      17,373 6,835 20,198 10,808 65,683 37,657 -2698305 -3608738 1.0000 1.0000
36 Poland 0.28     0.14     2,992     5,578     0.57      0.69      2,566 3,261 3,216 3,531 8,097 5,195 -4961715 -4422498 0.0802 0.2933
88 India 0.18     0.10     456        7,100     0.33      0.78      222 3,112 263 3,327 963 3,892 -9720412 -4542144 0.0035 0.2609
v=5.0
World 0.20     0.12     3,458     8,006     561 4,864 1,527 6,081 27,408 13,433 -1.52943E+27 -9.56376E+25 0.1385 0.3273
6 United States 0.32     0.24     18,063   12,428   1.00      1.00      17,014 6,570 19,233 10,375 61,132 35,966 -1.41054E+25 -5.04691E+25 1.0000 1.0000
36 Poland 0.27     0.13     3,042     5,846     0.57      0.70      2,493 3,277 3,060 3,548 7,572 5,024 -1.60721E+26 -9.56694E+25 0.0129 0.2245
88 India 0.17     0.10     477        7,509     0.34      0.80      221 3,162 261 3,363 905 3,933 -2.35890E+27 -1.05833E+26 0.0001 0.1883
Unemployment Labor Income








Consumption Demogrant Labor Supply
Average Price PPP Average Welfare
U.S. Welfare
Weights 5% 50% 95%
























































PPP deflator Calculated PPP